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Results of the OIG Review
A significant part of our review focused on DOJ’s and Attorney General Barr’s role in the law enforcement clearing operation that occurred at Lafayette Park on June 1 related to the USPP and USSS plan to install fencing along H Street. As detailed in the previously- issued DOI OIG report, the USPP and USSS were in overall operational command of the law enforcement clearing operation that occurred that day. Our review found that personnel from three DOJ law enforcement components—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)—were deployed to Lafayette Park on June 1 to assist the USPP and USSS following the violence that occurred on the prior 3 days. We further found that while ATF, BOP, and USMS personnel assisted in the operation at Lafayette Park that occurred on June 1, they did so under the direction of the USPP and USSS unified command, with ATF, BOP, and USMS supervisors leading their respective teams. Neither the FBI nor the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had personnel at Lafayette Park on June 1.
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We also did not find evidence to support a statement on June 2 to the press by then DOJ Director of Public Affairs Kerri Kupec that Barr had told law enforcement officials on June 1 to “[g]et it done.” Witnesses told us they did not hear Barr make such a statement, and we therefore concluded that Kupec’s statement gave the inaccurate impression Barr had personally ordered the operation and led to significant public confusion regarding DOJ’s role in it. Because Barr and Kupec declined to be interviewed by us, we were unable to determine whether Barr approved of Kupec’s statement prior to its release.
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For example, at 5:00 p.m. on June 1, Barr’s Chief of Staff sent an email telling the BOP to deploy personnel to the White House immediately, but BOP staff received no guidance as to their mission or rules of engagement. One BOP supervisor stated that he did not have his personnel bring shields with them because they were unaware that they were going to be assisting with crowd control. It was not until after they arrived at Lafayette Park that they learned of their role, less than an hour before the clearing operation began. In addition, we found that the FBI’s deployments of its personnel elsewhere on the streets of Washington, D.C. on the evening of June 1 and to the area north of Lafayette Park on June 3—the latter of which was part of an FBI-coordinated operation to form a security perimeter north of Lafayette Park encompassing St. John’s Church at Barr’s direction—lacked adequate planning, failed to provide sufficient guidance to personnel regarding their mission and legal authorities, and, by sending armed agents to respond to civil unrest for which they lacked the proper training or equipment, created safety and security risks for the agents and the public. We also found that BOP deployed personnel without vests or jackets clearly identifying them as BOP law enforcement personnel. We determined that the lack of such identifying markings was due to the fact that BOP does not traditionally deploy personnel in a public-facing role outside the prison setting.
We were troubled by the Department leadership’s decision-making that required DOJ law enforcement agents and elite tactical units to perform missions for which they lacked the proper equipment and training. Multiple witnesses also told us that leadership did not timely and effectively communicate these deployment decisions to subordinates and non-DOJ agencies involved in the response. ..."