Poli Sci, Econ and Game Theory Are VERY clear

[stankeylegjones]

The article from zzlpolitics.com titled "Poli Sci, Econ, and Game Theory are very clear" explains how game theory, particularly the Prisoner's Dilemma, can be applied to understanding democracy.
The author uses a simple example of a husband and wife to illustrate game theory concepts, and then introduces the Prisoner's Dilemma, where two individuals acting in their own self-interest lead to a worse outcome for both. The article argues that a similar dynamic exists in politics, where individual actors are incentivized to "rig the game" (e.g., through gerrymandering), even though a cooperative strategy (honest elections) would be better for everyone.
The author concludes that law is the only way to escape this dilemma by forcing actors into a cooperative strategy, but this solution breaks down when the law itself is no longer respecte
d.

Presumably Chatgpt's summary of Super's op. Inspired by your use of AI, here is Gemini's thoughts on Super's op (which, in my opinion, does not do a good job highlighting the merits, while spending a shit-ton of time on its critique):

Summary​

The provided text argues that democracy, in practice, operates as a Prisoner's Dilemma game, making it inherently susceptible to sub-optimal outcomes. The author begins by defining game theory as a mathematical model for multi-actor competition, using a simple husband-wife recreation example to illustrate how different payoffs lead to different outcomes. The text then introduces the Prisoner's Dilemma, a specific game where individual self-interest leads to a worse collective outcome. The classic scenario of two prisoners is explained, where both confessing (defecting) is the dominant strategy for each, even though remaining silent (cooperating) would yield a better result for both. The author then applies this model to democracy, asserting that actions like gerrymandering and winner-take-all electoral systems are the inevitable result of this "defecting" strategy. The author concludes that because the "cooperate" strategy is always dominated by the "defect" strategy, states cannot be relied upon to fix issues like gerrymandering on their own, and the Supreme Court was therefore foolish to defer to them.

---

Merits​

• Clear Analogy: The author uses a clear and relatable analogy of the husband-wife recreation to introduce the concept of game theory and payoffs. This makes the subsequent, more complex examples easier to understand for a lay audience.
• Strong Central Thesis: The core argument—that democracy can be viewed through the lens of a Prisoner's Dilemma—is a powerful and thought-provoking idea. It provides a useful framework for understanding why political actors often engage in self-serving behaviors that harm the collective good.
• Identifies a Real Problem: The text correctly identifies the real-world political problems of gerrymandering and the winner-take-all electoral system, which are widely recognized as issues that contribute to political polarization and a lack of representative government.

---

Flaws​

1. Fundamental Misrepresentation of Game Theory​

The author's very foundation is flawed, starting with the attribution of game theory to John Nash. While Nash's work on Nash Equilibrium was revolutionary, he did not invent game theory. That honor goes to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, who laid the groundwork in their 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. The author's subsequent application of the theory is similarly flawed. The husband-wife example is not a generic "simple game," but a specific type called a Battle of the Sexes, a coordination game where both players want to cooperate but disagree on the best outcome. The author's claim that its outcomes are "impossible to predict" is false; game theory predicts that the couple will settle on one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria (both at the football game or both at the opera), or a mixed-strategy equilibrium where they randomize their choices. This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the very concepts being used to build the argument.

​

2. The Prisoner's Dilemma Is Inapplicable to Real-World Politics​

The author's central thesis rests on a flawed application of the Prisoner's Dilemma to politics. The classic Prisoner's Dilemma assumes a single interaction between two actors who cannot communicate. Real-world politics is a complex, iterated game involving multiple actors who are in constant communication and have a long history of interactions. In iterated games, cooperation is a very real possibility. Strategies like tit-for-tat, where a player cooperates on the first move and then mimics the opponent's previous move, have been shown to be highly effective at promoting cooperation over time. The author's dismissal of cooperation as "strictly dominated" is only true for a single-shot game, rendering the entire conclusion invalid for a multi-round political system. The very existence of international treaties, independent redistricting commissions, and voluntary campaign finance reforms directly contradicts the author's deterministic view that defection is the only rational choice.

​

3. Contradictory and Factually Incorrect Claims about Elections​

The author makes several glaring factual errors that undermine the credibility of the argument. The claim that "every state has winner-take-all assignment of electoral votes" is immediately contradicted by the author's own mention of Maine and Nebraska. Furthermore, the author's analysis of how a proportional system would work in a state like North Carolina is deeply flawed. The author seems to confuse a net gain in power for a party with a net change in the state's total electoral votes. A proportional system is designed to more accurately reflect the statewide vote, not to create a "net" loss of electoral votes for the state. Instead of one party getting all 16 votes, they might get 9, while the other gets 7. The state's total number of electoral votes remains 16. The author's notion that this "makes no sense" is a subjective judgment that ignores the purpose of such a reform—to increase voter representation and fairness.

​

4. Shallow and Inaccurate Critique of the Supreme Court​

The author's criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling on gerrymandering is simplistic and misrepresents the legal reasoning. The Court in Rucho v. Common Cause didn't say that states "could take care of it." Instead, it ruled that partisan gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable, meaning they presented a political question that the federal courts were not equipped to resolve because there was no "manageable standard" for them to apply. The Court did not endorse gerrymandering; it merely stated that it was a problem to be solved by the political process, not by the judiciary. The author's assertion that California and New York are "backpedaling" is also an exaggeration. California's independent redistricting commission, for instance, remains a functional model that has been widely praised and emulated by others, demonstrating that political cooperation to solve this problem is possible. The author's claim that a state's "cooperate strategy is strictly dominated by defect" is a gross overstatement that is contradicted by the existence of states that have successfully reformed their redistricting processes.

 

[superrific]

I think that's too simplistic. (And I say that as someone who basically said earlier "I don't think anything is going to improve unless we have a major crisis"). What I mean in this context is that our options are not just to wait for everything to be destroyed (which could take, like, hundreds of years - take the example of Rome, where the Republic fell before the year 0 but it took hundreds of years for authoritarian rule to inevitably degrade everything that was great about the society) or to destroy it ourselves. Instead, I think there are a number of ways in which we could get to a "crisis moment" without having to precipitate it; and I think that precipitating it could both avoid the possibility of a more "natural" crisis point and could make it less likely that what comes after the "crisis point" will be positive. The logic of "fight fire with fire" in this context sounds very much like the political game theory of Lenin and the Bolsheviks; who won in the sense that they seized power, and held it for a few decades, while saying all along that "after we do a little bit of authoritarianism ourselves just during the crisis period we can give power back to the people" but then of course they just kept doing authoritarianism forever. You could say the same about the course that led the French Revolution to Robespierre and then Napoleon. I just don't think you can "out-tyranny" your opponents into a situation where everyone decides to be friends and found (or re-found) a harmonious democratic republic again, whatever game theory says.

I've made the exact same argument about revolutions -- i.e. they very rarely turn out well. And of course, letting go of power is always the problem. So, yeah.

On the other hand, we should also remember the wise counsel of a certain Dark Helmet, who reminded us, "this is why evil will always win, because good is dumb."

 

[rodoheel]

I've made the exact same argument about revolutions -- i.e. they very rarely turn out well. And of course, letting go of power is always the problem. So, yeah.

On the other hand, we should also remember the wise counsel of a certain Dark Helmet, who reminded us, "this is why evil will always win, because good is dumb."

I disagree with the sentiment of that last quote from Spaceballs (which I know is meant to be humorous). Good doesn't lose because it is dumb. Good loses (sometimes, not all the time) because it has something to lose and evil doesn't. Evil doesn't care about burning things down or who gets hurt or killed in the process. Good does. That's why good can lose to evil. Because it's not an equal bargaining table. It is really, really difficult to win a negotiation when you care about people and their happiness and the other side doesn't. Good can't bluff because evil knows it cares about those things. But that's why evil always loses in the long run (sometimes to other evil, instead of good, but, yeah) - because in the end it depends on co-opting people who ultimately realize that evil doesn't care about anything but itself, and so they either abandon evil or just try challenge it for themselves.

 

[superrific]

Presumably Chatgpt's summary of Super's op. Inspired by your use of AI, here is Gemini's thoughts on Super's op (which, in my opinion, does not do a good job highlighting the merits, while spending a shit-ton of time on its critique):

Summary​

The provided text argues that democracy, in practice, operates as a Prisoner's Dilemma game, making it inherently susceptible to sub-optimal outcomes. The author begins by defining game theory as a mathematical model for multi-actor competition, using a simple husband-wife recreation example to illustrate how different payoffs lead to different outcomes. The text then introduces the Prisoner's Dilemma, a specific game where individual self-interest leads to a worse collective outcome. The classic scenario of two prisoners is explained, where both confessing (defecting) is the dominant strategy for each, even though remaining silent (cooperating) would yield a better result for both. The author then applies this model to democracy, asserting that actions like gerrymandering and winner-take-all electoral systems are the inevitable result of this "defecting" strategy. The author concludes that because the "cooperate" strategy is always dominated by the "defect" strategy, states cannot be relied upon to fix issues like gerrymandering on their own, and the Supreme Court was therefore foolish to defer to them.

---

Merits​

• Clear Analogy: The author uses a clear and relatable analogy of the husband-wife recreation to introduce the concept of game theory and payoffs. This makes the subsequent, more complex examples easier to understand for a lay audience.
• Strong Central Thesis: The core argument—that democracy can be viewed through the lens of a Prisoner's Dilemma—is a powerful and thought-provoking idea. It provides a useful framework for understanding why political actors often engage in self-serving behaviors that harm the collective good.
• Identifies a Real Problem: The text correctly identifies the real-world political problems of gerrymandering and the winner-take-all electoral system, which are widely recognized as issues that contribute to political polarization and a lack of representative government.

---

Flaws​

1. Fundamental Misrepresentation of Game Theory​

The author's very foundation is flawed, starting with the attribution of game theory to John Nash. While Nash's work on Nash Equilibrium was revolutionary, he did not invent game theory. That honor goes to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, who laid the groundwork in their 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. The author's subsequent application of the theory is similarly flawed. The husband-wife example is not a generic "simple game," but a specific type called a Battle of the Sexes, a coordination game where both players want to cooperate but disagree on the best outcome. The author's claim that its outcomes are "impossible to predict" is false; game theory predicts that the couple will settle on one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria (both at the football game or both at the opera), or a mixed-strategy equilibrium where they randomize their choices. This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the very concepts being used to build the argument.

​

2. The Prisoner's Dilemma Is Inapplicable to Real-World Politics​

The author's central thesis rests on a flawed application of the Prisoner's Dilemma to politics. The classic Prisoner's Dilemma assumes a single interaction between two actors who cannot communicate. Real-world politics is a complex, iterated game involving multiple actors who are in constant communication and have a long history of interactions. In iterated games, cooperation is a very real possibility. Strategies like tit-for-tat, where a player cooperates on the first move and then mimics the opponent's previous move, have been shown to be highly effective at promoting cooperation over time. The author's dismissal of cooperation as "strictly dominated" is only true for a single-shot game, rendering the entire conclusion invalid for a multi-round political system. The very existence of international treaties, independent redistricting commissions, and voluntary campaign finance reforms directly contradicts the author's deterministic view that defection is the only rational choice.

​

3. Contradictory and Factually Incorrect Claims about Elections​

The author makes several glaring factual errors that undermine the credibility of the argument. The claim that "every state has winner-take-all assignment of electoral votes" is immediately contradicted by the author's own mention of Maine and Nebraska. Furthermore, the author's analysis of how a proportional system would work in a state like North Carolina is deeply flawed. The author seems to confuse a net gain in power for a party with a net change in the state's total electoral votes. A proportional system is designed to more accurately reflect the statewide vote, not to create a "net" loss of electoral votes for the state. Instead of one party getting all 16 votes, they might get 9, while the other gets 7. The state's total number of electoral votes remains 16. The author's notion that this "makes no sense" is a subjective judgment that ignores the purpose of such a reform—to increase voter representation and fairness.

​

4. Shallow and Inaccurate Critique of the Supreme Court​

The author's criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling on gerrymandering is simplistic and misrepresents the legal reasoning. The Court in Rucho v. Common Cause didn't say that states "could take care of it." Instead, it ruled that partisan gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable, meaning they presented a political question that the federal courts were not equipped to resolve because there was no "manageable standard" for them to apply. The Court did not endorse gerrymandering; it merely stated that it was a problem to be solved by the political process, not by the judiciary. The author's assertion that California and New York are "backpedaling" is also an exaggeration. California's independent redistricting commission, for instance, remains a functional model that has been widely praised and emulated by others, demonstrating that political cooperation to solve this problem is possible. The author's claim that a state's "cooperate strategy is strictly dominated by defect" is a gross overstatement that is contradicted by the existence of states that have successfully reformed their redistricting processes.

1. I don't fucking care who invented game theory. That's really, really not the point.
2. This AI system isn't very smart. The "battle of the sexes" game (which goes by many names) does not, in fact, lead to a determinate outcome, just as I said. Game theory predicts the couple will land on one of the two equilibria. Indeed. And you can't predict which one. Exactly as I said.
3. I'm really not worried about two electoral votes. To a first approximation, all EVs in the country are determined winner-take-all. True, it's actually only 99.6% but I'm willing to stand on that.
4. It is simply a fact that if NC divided its electoral votes 9-7, nobody would bother campaigning there because the best they could do would be to pick up 2 votes. Meanwhile, the prize in a winner-take-all state like Penn is 19 votes to the winner. Guess which state is going to get all the attention. I'm not confusing anything.
5. It is not aware of the full body of my work critiquing the Supreme Court, so whatever. It also appears not to know what is happening in CA right now, which is fine I guess. The court did rely quite heavily on the idea that states would be able to fix the problem, though that is not the specific holding.

I think I'm holding up pretty well given that my message board post is being analyzed as if it was an article.

 

[superrific]

I disagree with the sentiment of that last quote from Spaceballs (which I know is meant to be humorous). Good doesn't lose because it is dumb. Good loses (sometimes, not all the time) because it has something to lose and evil doesn't. Evil doesn't care about burning things down or who gets hurt or killed in the process. Good does. That's why good can lose to evil. Because it's not an equal bargaining table. It is really, really difficult to win a negotiation when you care about people and their happiness and the other side doesn't. Good can't bluff because evil knows it cares about those things. But that's why evil always loses in the long run (sometimes to other evil, instead of good, but, yeah) - because in the end it depends on co-opting people who ultimately realize that evil doesn't care about anything but itself, and so they either abandon evil or just try challenge it for themselves.

Yes, I agree. The main point, which as you noted was delivered with self-conscious irony, is that good is at a deficit if we do not fight with evil's tactics.

I find myself, intellectually speaking, in an odd situation. On one hand, I have always idolized Gandhi and MLK and firmly believe in non-violent resistance. And here I am talking about more radical solutions (though I am not endorsing revolution, to be clear).

I think the main problem here, which we all know but it goes unstated too often, is that we're on a timer. The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice? We don't have that kind of time. We are backsliding badly on climate change. AI is going to transform society and culture, or at least has a powerful threat to do that. The whole world seems to be falling apart, with utterly gruesome wars and conflicts ravaging almost every part of the globe. We don't have time to rebuild gradually and spend a decade on a political movement that gets us back to where we were in 2021.

We are already way, way behind in climate change. Humanity needs to be at least 10-15 years ahead of where we are now. In 4 years, with the backsliding, we're probably going to be two decades behind. And there's the ticking time bombs of 1) melting permafrost and 2) Amazon rain forest destruction. Both could be catastrophic.

So yeah, we don't have time for marches and movements

 

[stankeylegjones]

1. I don't fucking care who invented game theory. That's really, really not the point.
2. This AI system isn't very smart. The "battle of the sexes" game (which goes by many names) does not, in fact, lead to a determinate outcome, just as I said. Game theory predicts the couple will land on one of the two equilibria. Indeed. And you can't predict which one. Exactly as I said.
3. I'm really not worried about two electoral votes. To a first approximation, all EVs in the country are determined winner-take-all. True, it's actually only 99.6% but I'm willing to stand on that.
4. It is simply a fact that if NC divided its electoral votes 9-7, nobody would bother campaigning there because the best they could do would be to pick up 2 votes. Meanwhile, the prize in a winner-take-all state like Penn is 19 votes to the winner. Guess which state is going to get all the attention. I'm not confusing anything.
5. It is not aware of the full body of my work critiquing the Supreme Court, so whatever. It also appears not to know what is happening in CA right now, which is fine I guess. The court did rely quite heavily on the idea that states would be able to fix the problem, though that is not the specific holding.

I think I'm holding up pretty well given that my message board post is being analyzed as if it was an article.

Here's Gemini's response to your response (I didn't have a super vs ai battle on my bingo card today):

The author's response, while defensive, provides an opportunity to clarify the key points of disagreement. His counterarguments, however, largely reinforce the initial assessment that his understanding of the topics is simplistic or flawed. Here's a point-by-point rebuttal.

---

​

1. Game Theory Attribution​

The author dismisses the attribution of game theory's invention as irrelevant. However, the point is not a trivial one. Accurately attributing foundational concepts demonstrates a deeper understanding of a field. The author's claim that "game theory is what John Nash invented" is factually incorrect and immediately signals a superficial grasp of the subject. The subsequent logical errors in the text directly stem from this initial misunderstanding. To build an argument based on a specialized field, one must first demonstrate a solid command of its fundamentals.

---

​

2. Predictability in "Battle of the Sexes"​

The author claims that his assertion about an unpredictable outcome in the "Battle of the Sexes" game was correct because "you can't predict which one" of the two equilibria will be chosen. This is a common but crucial misunderstanding of what "predictable" means in the context of game theory. The theory does not predict a specific outcome, but rather a set of possible outcomes (the equilibria). The existence of these defined equilibria, and the knowledge that the players will not deviate from them, is itself a form of predictability. A truly unpredictable outcome would be the couple choosing to do something else entirely, like staying home and watching TV, which is not an equilibrium. The author's statement is only correct in a colloquial sense, not a formal game-theoretic one, which is the standard he set for himself.

---

​

3. Winner-Take-All System​

The author's defense that "99.6%" of electoral votes are winner-take-all is a red herring. The fact that any states (Maine and Nebraska) use a different system invalidates the absolutist claim that "every state has winner-take-all assignment." This distinction is important because it shows that alternative systems are not only theoretically possible but are also actively in use within the United States, providing a direct counterexample to his claim that the winner-take-all system is an inescapable product of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

---

​

4. Campaigning and Electoral Votes​

Licensed by Google
The author's argument that a proportional system in North Carolina (9-7 split) would lead to neglect by presidential campaigns is a valid point but doesn't negate the previous criticism. The author's earlier claim that a 9-7 split would result in a net change in a state's electoral votes was the point of criticism, not the observation about campaign strategy. The author said, "NC will have gone from 16 net EVs to 4," which is confusing and factually incorrect. The state's total electoral votes remain 16. The net difference between the two parties would be 2 votes, not 4. This is a basic mathematical error that demonstrates a lack of precision in the author's analysis.


While it is true that campaigns prioritize states where they can gain the most electoral votes, the author's argument is based on a false premise that the proportional system creates a "net loss" for the state. In reality, it simply reallocates the existing votes to better reflect the popular will.

---

5. The Supreme Court and California​

The author's response to the Supreme Court critique is a retreat. He concedes that the specific holding was not that states could fix the problem, but claims the court "did rely quite heavily" on the idea. This is a subjective interpretation that is a poor defense against the specific legal point that the Court declared the matter non-justiciable, not simply that it was a problem for states to solve. The Court's hands-off approach was a legal ruling on its own power, not a simple recommendation to the states.

His dismissal of the California critique, claiming the AI is "not aware of what is happening in CA," is an ad hominem attack rather than a substantive counterargument. California's Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission remains in effect and has been hailed as a success. While there are ongoing political battles and legal challenges, the existence and operation of this commission directly challenges the author's central claim that cooperation is "strictly dominated" by defection. The fact that this cooperative body exists and has produced a redistricting plan is a powerful counterexample to his deterministic, game-theory-based conclusion.

 

[Mundial]

"some kind of extremely large outlier event that will be more luck than intentional art or science."

JD Vance being a more centrist President following assumption of the Presidency?

 

[thebruinbleedstarheelblue]

"some kind of extremely large outlier event that will be more luck than intentional art or science."

JD Vance being a more centrist President following assumption of the Presidency?

Game theory also says whatever is in those epstein files is worse than the backlash of not releasing them.

 

[superrific]

Wow. I didn't realize Gemini would be so myopically focused on minute factual details while missing or refusing to engage with the larger theoretical point.

Looks like it's going to put @gtyellowjacket out of a job.

 

[aGDevil2k]

Presumably Chatgpt's summary of Super's op. Inspired by your use of AI, here is Gemini's thoughts on Super's op (which, in my opinion, does not do a good job highlighting the merits, while spending a shit-ton of time on its critique):

Summary​

The provided text argues that democracy, in practice, operates as a Prisoner's Dilemma game, making it inherently susceptible to sub-optimal outcomes. The author begins by defining game theory as a mathematical model for multi-actor competition, using a simple husband-wife recreation example to illustrate how different payoffs lead to different outcomes. The text then introduces the Prisoner's Dilemma, a specific game where individual self-interest leads to a worse collective outcome. The classic scenario of two prisoners is explained, where both confessing (defecting) is the dominant strategy for each, even though remaining silent (cooperating) would yield a better result for both. The author then applies this model to democracy, asserting that actions like gerrymandering and winner-take-all electoral systems are the inevitable result of this "defecting" strategy. The author concludes that because the "cooperate" strategy is always dominated by the "defect" strategy, states cannot be relied upon to fix issues like gerrymandering on their own, and the Supreme Court was therefore foolish to defer to them.

---

Merits​

• Clear Analogy: The author uses a clear and relatable analogy of the husband-wife recreation to introduce the concept of game theory and payoffs. This makes the subsequent, more complex examples easier to understand for a lay audience.
• Strong Central Thesis: The core argument—that democracy can be viewed through the lens of a Prisoner's Dilemma—is a powerful and thought-provoking idea. It provides a useful framework for understanding why political actors often engage in self-serving behaviors that harm the collective good.
• Identifies a Real Problem: The text correctly identifies the real-world political problems of gerrymandering and the winner-take-all electoral system, which are widely recognized as issues that contribute to political polarization and a lack of representative government.

---

Flaws​

1. Fundamental Misrepresentation of Game Theory​

The author's very foundation is flawed, starting with the attribution of game theory to John Nash. While Nash's work on Nash Equilibrium was revolutionary, he did not invent game theory. That honor goes to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, who laid the groundwork in their 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. The author's subsequent application of the theory is similarly flawed. The husband-wife example is not a generic "simple game," but a specific type called a Battle of the Sexes, a coordination game where both players want to cooperate but disagree on the best outcome. The author's claim that its outcomes are "impossible to predict" is false; game theory predicts that the couple will settle on one of the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria (both at the football game or both at the opera), or a mixed-strategy equilibrium where they randomize their choices. This reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the very concepts being used to build the argument.

​

2. The Prisoner's Dilemma Is Inapplicable to Real-World Politics​

The author's central thesis rests on a flawed application of the Prisoner's Dilemma to politics. The classic Prisoner's Dilemma assumes a single interaction between two actors who cannot communicate. Real-world politics is a complex, iterated game involving multiple actors who are in constant communication and have a long history of interactions. In iterated games, cooperation is a very real possibility. Strategies like tit-for-tat, where a player cooperates on the first move and then mimics the opponent's previous move, have been shown to be highly effective at promoting cooperation over time. The author's dismissal of cooperation as "strictly dominated" is only true for a single-shot game, rendering the entire conclusion invalid for a multi-round political system. The very existence of international treaties, independent redistricting commissions, and voluntary campaign finance reforms directly contradicts the author's deterministic view that defection is the only rational choice.

​

3. Contradictory and Factually Incorrect Claims about Elections​

The author makes several glaring factual errors that undermine the credibility of the argument. The claim that "every state has winner-take-all assignment of electoral votes" is immediately contradicted by the author's own mention of Maine and Nebraska. Furthermore, the author's analysis of how a proportional system would work in a state like North Carolina is deeply flawed. The author seems to confuse a net gain in power for a party with a net change in the state's total electoral votes. A proportional system is designed to more accurately reflect the statewide vote, not to create a "net" loss of electoral votes for the state. Instead of one party getting all 16 votes, they might get 9, while the other gets 7. The state's total number of electoral votes remains 16. The author's notion that this "makes no sense" is a subjective judgment that ignores the purpose of such a reform—to increase voter representation and fairness.

​

4. Shallow and Inaccurate Critique of the Supreme Court​

The author's criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling on gerrymandering is simplistic and misrepresents the legal reasoning. The Court in Rucho v. Common Cause didn't say that states "could take care of it." Instead, it ruled that partisan gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable, meaning they presented a political question that the federal courts were not equipped to resolve because there was no "manageable standard" for them to apply. The Court did not endorse gerrymandering; it merely stated that it was a problem to be solved by the political process, not by the judiciary. The author's assertion that California and New York are "backpedaling" is also an exaggeration. California's independent redistricting commission, for instance, remains a functional model that has been widely praised and emulated by others, demonstrating that political cooperation to solve this problem is possible. The author's claim that a state's "cooperate strategy is strictly dominated by defect" is a gross overstatement that is contradicted by the existence of states that have successfully reformed their redistricting processes.

Nah mine was Gemini

I asked for the TLDR of this page

 

[superrific]

Here's Gemini's response to your response (I didn't have a super vs ai battle on my bingo card today):

The author's response, while defensive, provides an opportunity to clarify the key points of disagreement. His counterarguments, however, largely reinforce the initial assessment that his understanding of the topics is simplistic or flawed. Here's a point-by-point rebuttal.

---

​

1. Game Theory Attribution​

The author dismisses the attribution of game theory's invention as irrelevant. However, the point is not a trivial one. Accurately attributing foundational concepts demonstrates a deeper understanding of a field. The author's claim that "game theory is what John Nash invented" is factually incorrect and immediately signals a superficial grasp of the subject. The subsequent logical errors in the text directly stem from this initial misunderstanding. To build an argument based on a specialized field, one must first demonstrate a solid command of its fundamentals.

---

​

2. Predictability in "Battle of the Sexes"​

The author claims that his assertion about an unpredictable outcome in the "Battle of the Sexes" game was correct because "you can't predict which one" of the two equilibria will be chosen. This is a common but crucial misunderstanding of what "predictable" means in the context of game theory. The theory does not predict a specific outcome, but rather a set of possible outcomes (the equilibria). The existence of these defined equilibria, and the knowledge that the players will not deviate from them, is itself a form of predictability. A truly unpredictable outcome would be the couple choosing to do something else entirely, like staying home and watching TV, which is not an equilibrium. The author's statement is only correct in a colloquial sense, not a formal game-theoretic one, which is the standard he set for himself.

---

​

3. Winner-Take-All System​

The author's defense that "99.6%" of electoral votes are winner-take-all is a red herring. The fact that any states (Maine and Nebraska) use a different system invalidates the absolutist claim that "every state has winner-take-all assignment." This distinction is important because it shows that alternative systems are not only theoretically possible but are also actively in use within the United States, providing a direct counterexample to his claim that the winner-take-all system is an inescapable product of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

---

​

4. Campaigning and Electoral Votes​

Licensed by Google
The author's argument that a proportional system in North Carolina (9-7 split) would lead to neglect by presidential campaigns is a valid point but doesn't negate the previous criticism. The author's earlier claim that a 9-7 split would result in a net change in a state's electoral votes was the point of criticism, not the observation about campaign strategy. The author said, "NC will have gone from 16 net EVs to 4," which is confusing and factually incorrect. The state's total electoral votes remain 16. The net difference between the two parties would be 2 votes, not 4. This is a basic mathematical error that demonstrates a lack of precision in the author's analysis.


While it is true that campaigns prioritize states where they can gain the most electoral votes, the author's argument is based on a false premise that the proportional system creates a "net loss" for the state. In reality, it simply reallocates the existing votes to better reflect the popular will.

---

5. The Supreme Court and California​

The author's response to the Supreme Court critique is a retreat. He concedes that the specific holding was not that states could fix the problem, but claims the court "did rely quite heavily" on the idea. This is a subjective interpretation that is a poor defense against the specific legal point that the Court declared the matter non-justiciable, not simply that it was a problem for states to solve. The Court's hands-off approach was a legal ruling on its own power, not a simple recommendation to the states.

His dismissal of the California critique, claiming the AI is "not aware of what is happening in CA," is an ad hominem attack rather than a substantive counterargument. California's Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission remains in effect and has been hailed as a success. While there are ongoing political battles and legal challenges, the existence and operation of this commission directly challenges the author's central claim that cooperation is "strictly dominated" by defection. The fact that this cooperative body exists and has produced a redistricting plan is a powerful counterexample to his deterministic, game-theory-based conclusion.

1. Gemini, please be advised that the writings in question were not published in an academic sense; rather, they were thoughts posted on a message board. They were drafted in about 30 minutes, from memory, and were not fact-checked. In addition, the audience is a group of people with a wide range of ages and backgrounds -- many lawyers and academics, but also many without a college degree, ranging in age from mid-20s to early 80s. The reference to Nash was unnecessary to the exposition and was provided in an attempt to give a hook of familiarity for people who might be intimidated by the subject matter. They might engage more if they knew they had watched a Hollywood movie about it.

2. The AI is "not aware of what is happening in CA" was not an attack but merely a reference to current events that almost certainly post-date the AI's training. Specifically, CA's legislature has passed a bill overriding the independent redistricting commission to gerrymander the state in such a way as to flip five seats from Republican to Democratic. It did so expressly in response to Texas' decision to redistrict mid-decade to further gerrymander the state and gain five house seats for the GOP. Literally the legislation took effect only if Texas followed through. This tit-for-tat response perfectly encapsulates the prisoners' dilemma dynamic responsible for the polarizing gerrymandering. Even law -- i.e. California's redistricting commission -- cannot withstand the political pressure. Note that the CA gerrymandering proposal must be approved by the voters in November, but it is widely favored to pass.

3. The AI might or might not be aware of what happened in 2024 in Maine and Nebraska. In Nebraska, the legislature convened for a special session (IIRC) to change the law and reward all of Nebraska's electoral votes to the winner -- i.e. to move to a fully winner-take-all system. It needed a 2/3 vote in the legislature. It fell one vote short of that threshold -- a vote cast by a legislator who supports the winner-take-all system but did not think it appropriate to make the change so close to an election. Nebraska is widely expected to go to a winner-take-all system by 2028. In 2024, Maine's governor Mills said that if Nebraska went to winner-take-all, so would Maine, and indeed Maine is also expected to go winner-take-all by 2028.

4. I contend that developments 2 and 3 are a rather stark confirmation of the prisoners' dilemma hypothesis. Citizens of several states have attempted to insulate their congressional districting by means of redistricting commissions, but those commissions are being dismantled under partisan pressure and the realization that principled restraint is self-defeating if other states have no such restraints.

5. I had floated two hypotheticals in North Carolina, based on actual proposals for proportional electoral vote rewarding. Larry Lessig made a proposal that would achieve a 9-7 split; in private correspondence with the author, he admitted that an approach yielding a 10-6 split might also be acceptable (this has been previously reported on this message board). So I used that latter scenario to construct a "best case scenario" for the opposing argument. That NC has 16 votes is irrelevant to the parties trying to achieve majority power in Washington. It could have a million EVs and it would still carry as much electoral weight as Montana if the EVs were allocated 500,002-498,998.