“… the PRA directs the President, “[t]hrough the implementation of records management controls and other necessary actions,” to “take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that [presidential] activities ․ are adequately documented and that such records are preserved and maintained as Presidential records.” Id. § 2203(a).
… this court's two key PRA precedents, Armstrong v. Bush (Armstrong I ), 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President (Armstrong II ), 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
In Armstrong I, the plaintiffs, fearing that then-President George H.W. Bush was mishandling presidential and federal records from the tail end of the Reagan Administration, alleged that Bush's “inten[tion] to delete material from the White House computer systems” ran afoul of the PRA and other statutes. 924 F.2d at 286. We dismissed those claims, holding that given “the intricate statutory scheme Congress carefully drafted to keep in equipoise important competing political and constitutional concerns,” id. at 290, “the PRA precludes judicial review of the President's recordkeeping practices and decisions,” id. at 291.
Two years later, the case returned to our court, this time focusing (in part) on guidelines issued by the White House to distinguish between presidential and federal records. The plaintiffs alleged that the guidelines violated FOIA and the Federal Records Act because they classified federal records, generally subject to immediate public release, see 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA record publication provisions), as presidential records, which, pursuant to the PRA, do not become eligible for release until five years after the President leaves office (or later if the documents contain certain sensitive material), see Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1290–91 (comparing the two regimes).
We rejected the government's argument that Armstrong I barred this claim, explaining that the case “does not stand for the unequivocal proposition that all decisions made pursuant to the PRA are immune from judicial review.” Id. at 1293. Quite to the contrary, when determining whether the Executive's definition of “presidential records” subverts FOIA by labeling as “presidential” those federal records that are otherwise subject to immediate public release, we have authority to “review guidelines outlining what is, and what is not, a ‘presidential record.’ ” Id. at 1294.
CREW and the White House have very different views about the implications of Armstrong I and II for this case. CREW interprets Armstrong II as authorizing courts to review “the Executive's ability to exempt an entire class of records (those created on message-deleting applications) from the PRA's reach.” Appellants' Reply Br. 23. By contrast, the White House argues that the Armstrong decisions prohibit courts from reviewing any “claims that the President failed to comply with requirements of the [PRA].” Appellees' Br. 8. But we need not resolve that debate because even CREW agrees that when it comes to compliance with the PRA, courts have no jurisdiction to review the President's “day-to-day operations.” Appellants' Reply Br. 23.
As Armstrong I makes clear—and Armstrong II nowhere casts in doubt—when enacting the PRA, “Congress ․ sought assiduously to minimize outside interference with the day-to-day operations of the President.” Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290. That, however, is precisely what CREW now asks us to do. Determining whether White House personnel are in fact complying with the directive to conduct all work-related communication on official email would require just the kind of micromanaging proscribed by Armstrong I. …”