It doesn't. But the analogy addresses the issue of intent. You can't infer intent in a court of law merely from actions that could be easily explained in other ways. In order for a terrorism charge to stick, for instance, the jury would have to rule out "defendant was just angry" as a motivation, and on the evidence so far established, that would be impossible. As an attorney, you should know this -- but then again, there are a lot of things you don't know that you should.
This is why, for instance, the police often arrest people on minor crimes and then amend the indictment later. IIRC, the Boston Marathon bomber was initially detained on some minor charge, because that could be easily proven. Then, after investigating and finding actual evidence of intent, they charged with terrorism.
Some actions are res ipsa loquitur. Both bin Laden and McVeigh were clearly engaged in terrorism. There's no other way to describe those actions. Incidentally, because 9/11 was a transnational plot, the mens rea requirement would be lower and thus the required showing on intent is relaxed. But with McVeigh, the government had to prove a certain intent. IIRC, McVeigh either admitted to having that intent or didn't fight the point, but it would have been easily established of funding and anyway, because an anti-government activist blowing up a federal building speaks for itself.
But firebombing a Tesla dealership isn't remotely that. Hell, the government would have to prove that the defendants intended to cause property damage, which might not be possible. You'd have to rule out, "I was drunk and I was trying to throw this flaming bottle away from all the cars." This is why, often, crimes like this would be charged for a count requiring only a recklessness mens rea because that's obviously established. So before you can get these guys on terrorism, you'd have to be able to get them on malicious property destruction. It's so far away from a terrorism charge that even suggesting it should constitute prosecutorial misconduct.