Is the fact that a member of the military was obeying an order from a superior a defense in a criminal case against them?
In some cases, no. Under both long-standing international and U.S. military law, the fact that the accused engaged in criminal conduct pursuant to a superior’s order is
not a defense if the accused “knew the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful” (
Manual for Courts-Martial, rule 916(d)). In other words, the question is whether the order was clearly unlawful or the accused knew it to be so. If not, they may defend themselves against the charges by arguing that orders are presumed lawful and that they had no reason to know the order was unlawful.
Would it have been lawful to target the boat in the follow-on strikes to destroy any remaining drugs, even if the survivors would be killed?
No. Under international human rights law, which governed the strikes, it is unlawful to knowingly cause the death of individuals, even criminals, in order to destroy criminal assets, like drugs. As noted, the law of armed conflict does not apply (see above). But even if it did, it would appear impossible on the facts as reported to find the second strike lawful. The deaths of the two individuals, either as shipwrecked fighters or as civilians (see above), would have to be factored into a
proportionality analysis to assess whether the deaths were “excessive” relative to the anticipated military advantage of destroying the drugs. In other words, enough of the remaining drugs would likely have to be recoverable by other cartel members to justify killing the two survivors. And this is assuming that the recovery of the drugs would qualify as “military advantage” in the first place, a highly questionable proposition (one with which we disagree on the facts and the law). Moreover, if there were another feasible means of destroying or seizing the drugs without killing the survivors, the law of armed conflict precautions in attack rule would prohibit an attack likely to kill them. (And again, all of this assumes the law of armed conflict applied, which it did not.)
Was there a duty to try to rescue the survivors of the Sept. 2 attack?
Yes, if feasible. Under longstanding international law during both peacetime and armed conflict, there is an obligation to take practicable measures to rescue individuals who have been shipwrecked. It is one reflected in both the law of the sea and the law of armed conflict. During peacetime, the duty is to proceed at all possible speed to rescue persons in distress so long as doing so does not seriously endanger the ship or crew (
Law of the Sea Convention, art. 98). This was the applicable obligation because the United States was not in an armed conflict. Nevertheless, even during armed conflict, according to the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, “following each naval engagement at sea, the belligerents are obligated to take all possible measures,
consistent with the security of their forces, to search for and rescue the shipwrecked” (emphasis added). We note that the
Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual states, “The obligations to search for, collect, and take affirmative steps to protect the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked are subject to practical limitations” (7.4.4).
Has the United States violated the prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by striking the boats?
No. The
prohibition applies only to using force
against other States. The strikes are unlawful, but not as a violation of this UN Charter (and customary law) prohibition. A use of force against Venezuela (or within its territory but without its consent), absent an armed attack or imminent threat of one against the United States, would, however, implicate this prohibition (see below).
Has there been an “armed attack” against the United States that would justify U.S. military force in self-defense?
No. States may only use force in self-defense in response to an imminent or ongoing “armed attack” (UN Charter,
art. 51). Despite the Trump administration’s claims, and even if all of the claimed facts were true, there has been no “armed attack” (or imminent threat of armed attack) by any drug cartel or criminal gang against the United States. Trafficking drugs into a country cannot alone constitute an
armed attack that would trigger the right of self-defense in response. Therefore, the United States has no claim to use force in self-defense against any of these groups.
Is the buildup of U.S. forces off the coast of Venezuela and threats to employ them against Venezuela lawful?
No. Shows of force, such as exercises, are legal if designed to show resolve, as in the case of demonstrating a willingness to
defend against an unlawful armed attack. But
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary law prohibit States
from even threatening to use force unlawfully if the threats are communicated to the threatened State, coercive, and capable of being carried out. Senior U.S. officials, including the President, have openly and coercively suggested the forces could be used against Venezuela, and the U.S. military is obviously capable of mounting a large-scale attack against that State. Since the United States has no legal basis for using force against Venezuela or any drug cartels operating there (see above), the build-up with the accompanying threats is unlawful.
Would U.S. strikes on alleged cartel boats in Venezuelan waters or cartel facilities and personnel in Venezuela be lawful?
No. Military operations in Venezuelan territory would be
unlawful as a use of force against Venezuela in clear violation of the UN Charter (
art. 2(4)) and customary international law. Venezuela has not engaged in any activities that would qualify as an “armed attack” against the United States, the trigger for the right to use force against another State in self-defense. Nor have any of the cartels engaged in an armed attack against the United States, which, according to some States and experts, might open the door to operations against them on the basis that Venezuela is unwilling or unable to put an end to their hostile activities emanating from its territory.
May groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) be targeted?
No, not on that basis alone. An
FTO designation does not authorize the use of force against the designated organization or its members. It carries non-lethal penalties, such as making members of the FTO inadmissible to enter the United States and allowing for its assets to be blocked. An FTO designation “does
not require or create a ‘war’ or ‘armed conflict’ between the designee and the United States (or any state).” Nor does it trigger any wartime authorities. In short, the administration’s designation of certain cartels and criminal gangs as FTOs (or otherwise describing them as “narcoterrorists”) does not provide a legal basis for using force against them.