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Why is China saying this at this very moment?

p5mmr9 said:
It's likely that 4.5% GDP growth is exaggerated by half...and even if it is not - 4.5% represents a significant reduction from their Pre-Covid levels. China's biggest issue vis a vis its economy is that historically and culturally they've focused on production and anti-consumption - and transitioning to a consumption based economy is difficult. And regardless - having a few billion unemployed workers - as AI and automation handle production - is a recipe for social disaster. So, while I agree that China may be better suited to handle the social welfare of a community completely reliant on automation - it also doesn't paint a rosy picture.
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Your point about going to a consumption based model is a good one.

As for the growth rate, that's more of a short term thing in my view. Yes, it's decreased from where it was. That's because economic growth always slows as economies mature.

There are two main drivers of economic growth: productivity improvements and growth of factor inputs. The second one is considerably easier. There are remote, off-the-grid villages somewhere? Great, build a road and lay some cable and presto -- you've increased your factors as you've now brought labor online and an additional consumer market. Population growth is an increase in factor inputs (which is why immigration = growth). Women in the workforce is an increase in factor inputs.

Nascent economies have many opportunities to increase their factors, and thus they do. That's why their growth rates can look so eye-poppingly high. The Soviet Union did just that: in the 1920s, the Soviet economy grew quickly because it repurposed an almost feudal environment in the countryside to factor workers. After that, the Soviet economy stagnated because, unable to increase factors any further (especially with 10M dead in WWII or however many, plus millions less Ukranians from starvation and however many political prisoners etc), it would have to rely on productivity improvements and the Soviets were not so good at that (and they got worse over time).

China had a lot of factors to bring online, given its enormous population and the economic mess that the Cultural Revolution left. As the low-picking fruit gets harvested, the growth rate will necessarily decline. Eventually, the Chinese growth rate will, like the US growth rate, depend mostly on productivity improvements, such as those achieved through automation. Thus will China's and America's growth rates converge, unless one or the other countries pulls decisively ahead in technology.
 
What happens in a world where China starts producing better IP than the rest of the World? We keep firing scientist and researchers at the NIH and other organizations while graduating thousands of engineers and researchers every year.
 
p5mmr9 said:
The current Chinese system isn't "leftist" - the Chinese "Communist Party" isn't communist. It is authoritarian and doesn't really fit well on the Left/Right axis. In fact, there was debate in the party about changing their name but they kept it for "historical" reasons. Regardless, the Chinese people have benefited from the Chinese government's leadership in many areas. More people have been lifted out of poverty in China over the last 30 years than any other place in the history of civilization. China's poverty rate fell from nearly 90% in 1980 (!!!) to .7% now. It's a remarkable change. Infrastructure - roads, transportation, healthcare - have all improved equally dramatically.

Where the PRC fails is obviously human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of movement. Its treatment of the Uyghur and ethnic Tibetans is abhorrent. And since Covid - these issues have become more pronounced. Post Covid - China has faced a number of significant challenges and prior to Trump's inauguration - China appeared to be on the brink of economic collapse. They have a significant debt crisis that is only getitng worse and their youth unemployment is at staggering levels (22% ++) - they have a legion of unemployed university educated youths and only factory jobs available. It's a major crisis - and one that has historically led to open rebellion and strife.

All of that said - China is generally and historically anti-imperialist. What China demands is economic power more than imperialist power. China seeks the means to control its own corner of the world while insuring maximum economic benefit to its country. This isn't the Soviet Union, but I'm also not sure it is as much a threat to the USA hegemony as a lot of people think. They are however a significant threat to western IP. IP theft is their greatest crime and it is ongoing.
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So are you suggesting that about 1980, China decided to move fast and break things? If so, interesting that this same sentiment seems to be the animating feature of American's oligarchic tech overlords.
 
HintonJamesHeel said:
If we know anything in this country, a leader tweeting shit out is meaningless.

China has:
Currently a struggling economy
Huge reliance on imports
Terrible consumer confidence
Basically no diversity
Aging population
Declining birthrate

None of that takes into account the cost and overhead of being communist and suppressing thought and individualism.

China is not a threat. It used to be but no longer.
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This seems to be a rather unusual assessment.

I would like to see your assessment of the United States and differences of your assessment of the US under Obama/Biden vs trump.
 
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Paine said:
I don’t doubt that your scholar friends are thoughtful, but I’d caution against universalizing the views of a narrow, elite stratum educated in the West. There’s a difference between ideology as top-down doctrine and national purpose as lived emotional resonance. One doesn’t cancel the other out.
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Well, my last paragraph made that same point. On the other hand, they weren't just telling me their own views; they were describing other Chinese as well. Yes, I know -- not a reliable sample because of size and bias but I wouldn't throw it away either.

I'm not sure which of those two items -- ideology and lived emotional resonance -- you think China has in spades. I'd say that the lived emotional resonance is not there among the population, based on what I know which isn't nothing but isn't a hell of a lot either.
 
Paine said:
I get that your sample isn’t “nothing,” but this is where the limits of anecdotal exposure, especially filtered through elite academic circles, can really flatten things.

The idea that there’s no lived emotional resonance in China’s national narrative runs counter to a lot of observable phenomena: public ceremonies, popular films, viral online nationalism, and the broad public response to both internal crises and foreign pressure.

It’s not that every Chinese citizen is brimming with ideological fervor, but the CCP has clearly cultivated a shared sense of historical mission: overcoming the Century of Humiliation, resisting foreign interference, achieving rejuvenation. That emotional frame resonates far more deeply than Western observers often assume, especially those who only interact with the Western-educated subset of the Chinese population.

Frankly, we’d do well to ask why a narrative like that resonates so powerfully in the first place. What hunger does it fill? Because we’ve lost that sense of collective trajectory here, and pretending it’s all just empty propaganda will not help us recover it.
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What is your expertise in China? Sure, there are limits to anecdotal exposure. What's the basis for your views?

The popular films from the mainland are all censored so that's no indicator. So too with public ceremonies, which took place throughout the Cultural Revolution and ever since. I have no idea how to assess viral online nationalism, but given the lack of freedom of the Chinese internet, I wouldn't put much stock in that. Back when Hong Kong was still in British hands, the films coming out of that environment were not at all like the mainland. In fact, IIRC, the Chinese government repudiated those popular movies.

And you are suggesting here that the Chinese people look fondly upon the Mao years? They very much do not. That's why the Chinese government banned To Live by Zhang Yimou.
 
Paine said:
This is a message board, not a peer-reviewed journal. You’ve shared your views on China based on conversations with expat scholars and general reading, so have I. That’s fair game here. You don’t get to appeal to “expertise” when someone pushes back with a different interpretation, especially when your own basis is anecdotal and secondhand.

I’m not claiming academic expertise, and I’ve been careful not to present my view as definitive. But I also think we can’t reduce understanding of a country like China to “what elite academics or expats say” versus “everything else is propaganda.” My point isn’t that the CCP’s narrative is uniformly embraced or that there’s no censorship. Of course there is. The point is that national stories can resonate emotionally even in constrained environments, and often because they tap into deep historical memory and identity.

The appeal of the “rejuvenation” narrative isn’t about fondness for the Mao years. It’s about positioning modern China as overcoming foreign domination, poverty, and chaos to reclaim its place in the world. That framing draws on a selective memory of history, yes, but so do all national stories. And when you see large segments of the population respond with pride to milestones like the Belt and Road Initiative or technological achievements, that’s not just state coercion. It reflects a kind of emotional identification that is often missed by folks like yourself.

I’m not romanticizing the system or ignoring dissent. I’m saying that there’s a civic emotional reality in China that’s more complex than saying people are simply going through the motions.
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I wasn't appealing to expertise; I was just trying to figure out the basis for your views. Who are the large segments of the population responding with pride to Belt and Road?

This doesn't really matter. Your point is clearly aimed at the United States, and is using China only as a prop. That's fine. I take your point about the United States. The actual reality in China about this is more or less irrelevant.
 
OGtruthhurts said:
i was in china for 14 days in feb. they are ahead of us in everything you can see. i have no reasons to believe they arent ahead of us in things that i couldnt see.

theres simply no reply if one thinks they arent a huge threat.
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Largest Navy in the world. They would clean our clock with the incompetence we have at the helm.
 
superrific said:
Your point about going to a consumption based model is a good one.

As for the growth rate, that's more of a short term thing in my view. Yes, it's decreased from where it was. That's because economic growth always slows as economies mature.

There are two main drivers of economic growth: productivity improvements and growth of factor inputs. The second one is considerably easier. There are remote, off-the-grid villages somewhere? Great, build a road and lay some cable and presto -- you've increased your factors as you've now brought labor online and an additional consumer market. Population growth is an increase in factor inputs (which is why immigration = growth). Women in the workforce is an increase in factor inputs.

Nascent economies have many opportunities to increase their factors, and thus they do. That's why their growth rates can look so eye-poppingly high. The Soviet Union did just that: in the 1920s, the Soviet economy grew quickly because it repurposed an almost feudal environment in the countryside to factor workers. After that, the Soviet economy stagnated because, unable to increase factors any further (especially with 10M dead in WWII or however many, plus millions less Ukranians from starvation and however many political prisoners etc), it would have to rely on productivity improvements and the Soviets were not so good at that (and they got worse over time).

China had a lot of factors to bring online, given its enormous population and the economic mess that the Cultural Revolution left. As the low-picking fruit gets harvested, the growth rate will necessarily decline. Eventually, the Chinese growth rate will, like the US growth rate, depend mostly on productivity improvements, such as those achieved through automation. Thus will China's and America's growth rates converge, unless one or the other countries pulls decisively ahead in technology.
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There are structural issues in China revolving around private debt, unemployment, (lack of) employment opportunities, and both private and commercial real estate. China is overextended in a way that would make americans blush if they were paying attention. This is the nature of their economic slowdown. You could probably argue these issues are cyclical and related to an evolving economy (as you seem to be suggesting) - but I think there are deeper issues that are more cultural and far more difficult to overcome. The chinese economy isn't just evolving - it is in real distress. That pressure has been somewhat alleviated as a direct result of some of Trump's mishandling of the global economy. Trump sought to harm China and in some respects he's propped them up and given them a bit of an out. But these problems aren't just going to vanish with a few ASEAN and EU trade deals.
 
Paine said:
You say you weren’t appealing to expertise, but your response clearly questioned whether my view was legitimate based on credentials, which is a move you didn’t apply to your own anecdotal evidence. I think it’s fair for all of us to draw on the sources we have, as long as we’re honest about their limits.

And yes, my broader point is about the United States. I’m interested in what it would mean for us to reclaim a sense of national purpose that connects with ordinary people. Looking at how other societies do that, however imperfectly, isn’t “using them as props.” It’s trying to understand what we’ve lost and what we might still build.
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No, I was wondering if I was arguing into expertise (relatively speaking). Like maybe you had spent a semester studying abroad there, which wouldn't make you an expert but would be something more than speculation. If you can read Mandarin, that would be relevant for me to know.

To the extent I was "questioning" you, it was what I saw as something of a contrast between the confidence you displayed in your opinions and the basis for those opinions. Not a gross contrast. Not worth mentioning except now that it's come up.

My use of the word prop was inexact. The point was that the "sense of national purpose" that might take hold here will be based on our traditions; it will be constructed according to our social habits, expectations and geography; and that looking to China doesn't really add much because China is very different and also not very popular in the US
 
Paine said:
It’s fair to scrutinize that, but it should cut both ways.
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I don't think anyone on this board specifies the bases for their opinions as frequently and expressly as I do. In fact, in the original post, I acknowledged the limitations of my sample of opinion. I'm not sure why you think it doesn't cut both ways for me. When I know what I'm talking about, I say so. When I don't know what I'm talking about -- well, I rarely butt in when I know nothing, but sometimes I speculate or generalize from limited experience or am drawing on a couple of articles I read a decade ago and when that's the case, I'm up front about that. I offer it in my original post.
 
Paine said:
I appreciate that you try to qualify your sources. My point wasn’t to imply you’re never careful. It was to say that scrutiny of views should apply equally, especially when both of us are drawing from limited but thoughtful observation. My concern was with how quickly the question of legitimacy arose when I expressed confidence in a different interpretation, not with whether you’re generally transparent about your assumptions.
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I asked for the basis of your views -- you know, the same thing I supplied from the outset. If you specify the basis, then your authority will tend to speak for itself, at least vaguely. When I say, "these people told me their opinions," I don't expect you to therefore take it as gospel. It's a "low confidence" claim that should be evaluated accordingly. I don't think it's meaningless; it's clearly not a reliable basis (and that's not even taking account of the passage of time).

If you had said, "here's what I think based on general reading . . . " then I would have no reason to question the legitimacy. It would speak for itself. Low confidence source against low confidence source.
 
05C40 said:
So are you suggesting that about 1980, China decided to move fast and break things? If so, interesting that this same sentiment seems to be the animating feature of American's oligarchic tech overlords.
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No - they opened their economy to foreign investment. Rather than "move fast and break things" - they built things and improved infrastructure at a pace the world has never seen - beginning with the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
 
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