Paine
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You’re right that the decline of the Southern textile and furniture industries began before NAFTA or Walmart entered the picture. Automation, globalization, and shifts in capital investment were already transforming those sectors by the late ‘70s and early ‘80s.NAFTA nor Wal-Mart killed the Southern Textile industry……it was dying in the late ‘70’s and early-mid ‘80’s. So was the furniture industry.
At best, automated textile mills would replace the mills of the ‘50’s, ‘60’s, and ‘70’s. If automation replaced the workers, the mills are still there; the jobs are gone.
Democrats offered training to displaced mill workers (textile, steel, furniture, etc.); Republicans offered grievance. Poorly educated mill workers wanted their jobs back; their jobs were gone.
”The fumes of the Southern Strategy…..”
You think the Southern Strategy was dying in 1976-1984?
You think it was limited to the South?
The timing and political management of that decline still matter. So does the story people were told, or not told, about what was happening to them.
What NAFTA and Walmart represented wasn’t the beginning of the collapse, but a bipartisan endorsement of a model that said: “This is the future. Get used to it.”
Democrats offered job training, sure…but for what exactly? For service jobs at half the wages? A PowerPoint and a training voucher are not a political vision.
Republicans, meanwhile, offered a story. A bad story, often grounded in scapegoating, but a story that acknowledged loss, and assigned some emotional meaning to it.
What I’m arguing is this: when people say they want their jobs back, it’s not always a literal demand. It’s often a longing for dignity, stability, community, identity. A time when they felt useful, needed. We can’t just dismiss that as backward or irrational.
As for the “fumes of the Southern Strategy line…,” I think we might just be using the term differently. When I say Reagan’s coalition wasn’t running purely on the “fumes of the Southern Strategy,” I’m referring specifically to the Goldwater-to-Nixon era model: overtly racial appeals aimed at disaffected Southern whites, later repackaged in coded language.
What Reagan did was build on that foundation and expand it into a national emotional narrative that fused coded racial grievance with themes of economic individualism, national decline, and patriotic renewal. That’s what made it so potent. It wasn’t just the dog whistles; it was the story.
Lee Atwater said it best. By the 1980s, the coded language had become so abstract,”cutting taxes,” “small government,” “welfare reform,” that it didn’t just appeal to the South. It could sell in the Midwest, in the West, in the suburbs. And it brought in voters who didn’t think of themselves as racist, but who still responded emotionally to that broader narrative.
If we flatten that into just “hate and racism,” we miss how the emotional power of that message shaped American politics for decades and how a lot of working- and middle-class voters ended up inside that coalition not because they were committed bigots, but because the left had stopped telling a competing story that spoke to their lives.