Why is China saying this at this very moment?

[OGtruthhurts]

i was in china for 14 days in feb. they are ahead of us in everything you can see. i have no reasons to believe they arent ahead of us in things that i couldnt see.

theres simply no reply if one thinks they arent a huge threat.

 

[superrific]

This is a message board, not a peer-reviewed journal. You’ve shared your views on China based on conversations with expat scholars and general reading, so have I. That’s fair game here. You don’t get to appeal to “expertise” when someone pushes back with a different interpretation, especially when your own basis is anecdotal and secondhand.

I’m not claiming academic expertise, and I’ve been careful not to present my view as definitive. But I also think we can’t reduce understanding of a country like China to “what elite academics or expats say” versus “everything else is propaganda.” My point isn’t that the CCP’s narrative is uniformly embraced or that there’s no censorship. Of course there is. The point is that national stories can resonate emotionally even in constrained environments, and often because they tap into deep historical memory and identity.

The appeal of the “rejuvenation” narrative isn’t about fondness for the Mao years. It’s about positioning modern China as overcoming foreign domination, poverty, and chaos to reclaim its place in the world. That framing draws on a selective memory of history, yes, but so do all national stories. And when you see large segments of the population respond with pride to milestones like the Belt and Road Initiative or technological achievements, that’s not just state coercion. It reflects a kind of emotional identification that is often missed by folks like yourself.

I’m not romanticizing the system or ignoring dissent. I’m saying that there’s a civic emotional reality in China that’s more complex than saying people are simply going through the motions.

I wasn't appealing to expertise; I was just trying to figure out the basis for your views. Who are the large segments of the population responding with pride to Belt and Road?

This doesn't really matter. Your point is clearly aimed at the United States, and is using China only as a prop. That's fine. I take your point about the United States. The actual reality in China about this is more or less irrelevant.

 

[dukeman92]

i was in china for 14 days in feb. they are ahead of us in everything you can see. i have no reasons to believe they arent ahead of us in things that i couldnt see.

theres simply no reply if one thinks they arent a huge threat.

Largest Navy in the world. They would clean our clock with the incompetence we have at the helm.

 

[p5mmr9]

Your point about going to a consumption based model is a good one.

As for the growth rate, that's more of a short term thing in my view. Yes, it's decreased from where it was. That's because economic growth always slows as economies mature.

There are two main drivers of economic growth: productivity improvements and growth of factor inputs. The second one is considerably easier. There are remote, off-the-grid villages somewhere? Great, build a road and lay some cable and presto -- you've increased your factors as you've now brought labor online and an additional consumer market. Population growth is an increase in factor inputs (which is why immigration = growth). Women in the workforce is an increase in factor inputs.

Nascent economies have many opportunities to increase their factors, and thus they do. That's why their growth rates can look so eye-poppingly high. The Soviet Union did just that: in the 1920s, the Soviet economy grew quickly because it repurposed an almost feudal environment in the countryside to factor workers. After that, the Soviet economy stagnated because, unable to increase factors any further (especially with 10M dead in WWII or however many, plus millions less Ukranians from starvation and however many political prisoners etc), it would have to rely on productivity improvements and the Soviets were not so good at that (and they got worse over time).

China had a lot of factors to bring online, given its enormous population and the economic mess that the Cultural Revolution left. As the low-picking fruit gets harvested, the growth rate will necessarily decline. Eventually, the Chinese growth rate will, like the US growth rate, depend mostly on productivity improvements, such as those achieved through automation. Thus will China's and America's growth rates converge, unless one or the other countries pulls decisively ahead in technology.

There are structural issues in China revolving around private debt, unemployment, (lack of) employment opportunities, and both private and commercial real estate. China is overextended in a way that would make americans blush if they were paying attention. This is the nature of their economic slowdown. You could probably argue these issues are cyclical and related to an evolving economy (as you seem to be suggesting) - but I think there are deeper issues that are more cultural and far more difficult to overcome. The chinese economy isn't just evolving - it is in real distress. That pressure has been somewhat alleviated as a direct result of some of Trump's mishandling of the global economy. Trump sought to harm China and in some respects he's propped them up and given them a bit of an out. But these problems aren't just going to vanish with a few ASEAN and EU trade deals.

 

[Paine]

I wasn't appealing to expertise; I was just trying to figure out the basis for your views. Who are the large segments of the population responding with pride to Belt and Road?

This doesn't really matter. Your point is clearly aimed at the United States, and is using China only as a prop. That's fine. I take your point about the United States. The actual reality in China about this is more or less irrelevant.

You say you weren’t appealing to expertise, but your response clearly questioned whether my view was legitimate based on credentials, which is a move you didn’t apply to your own anecdotal evidence. I think it’s fair for all of us to draw on the sources we have, as long as we’re honest about their limits.

As for the Belt and Road point, I’m not claiming universal enthusiasm, but there are real, visible indicators of national pride around projects like BRI. Pew has found that 95% of Chinese people view their country favorably, and a strong majority believe China will surpass the U.S. as a global power. Those beliefs don’t exist in a vacuum. Public ceremonies, viral nationalist content, and massive domestic coverage of events like the Belt and Road Forum are all signals that these projects resonate emotionally with at least large parts of the population. In emerging economies, Pew also found widespread support for China’s development push, which reinforces how the narrative plays at home and abroad.

Of course it’s managed, and of course it’s partially top-down, but that doesn’t make it fake. Emotional identification with national stories can coexist with censorship. That’s how most national mythologies work, including our own.

And yes, my broader point is about the United States. I’m interested in what it would mean for us to reclaim a sense of national purpose that connects with ordinary people. Looking at how other societies do that, however imperfectly, isn’t “using them as props.” It’s trying to understand what we’ve lost and what we might still build.

 

[superrific]

You say you weren’t appealing to expertise, but your response clearly questioned whether my view was legitimate based on credentials, which is a move you didn’t apply to your own anecdotal evidence. I think it’s fair for all of us to draw on the sources we have, as long as we’re honest about their limits.

And yes, my broader point is about the United States. I’m interested in what it would mean for us to reclaim a sense of national purpose that connects with ordinary people. Looking at how other societies do that, however imperfectly, isn’t “using them as props.” It’s trying to understand what we’ve lost and what we might still build.

No, I was wondering if I was arguing into expertise (relatively speaking). Like maybe you had spent a semester studying abroad there, which wouldn't make you an expert but would be something more than speculation. If you can read Mandarin, that would be relevant for me to know.

To the extent I was "questioning" you, it was what I saw as something of a contrast between the confidence you displayed in your opinions and the basis for those opinions. Not a gross contrast. Not worth mentioning except now that it's come up.

My use of the word prop was inexact. The point was that the "sense of national purpose" that might take hold here will be based on our traditions; it will be constructed according to our social habits, expectations and geography; and that looking to China doesn't really add much because China is very different and also not very popular in the US

 

[dcf2]

I'm not sure if this is open - but to the point...

How China can become a biotechnology superpower

After decades of pioneering institutional change in Chinese research, neuroscientist Rao Yi explains why US hesitation might offer China an opportunity to catch up internationally.

www.nature.com

 

[Paine]

No, I was wondering if I was arguing into expertise (relatively speaking). Like maybe you had spent a semester studying abroad there, which wouldn't make you an expert but would be something more than speculation. If you can read Mandarin, that would be relevant for me to know.

To the extent I was "questioning" you, it was what I saw as something of a contrast between the confidence you displayed in your opinions and the basis for those opinions. Not a gross contrast. Not worth mentioning except now that it's come up.

My use of the word prop was inexact. The point was that the "sense of national purpose" that might take hold here will be based on our traditions; it will be constructed according to our social habits, expectations and geography; and that looking to China doesn't really add much because China is very different and also not very popular in the US

Thanks for clarifying your intent. That said, I still think the way the question was framed — “what’s your expertise?” — suggested a kind of credential check that you didn’t apply to your own anecdotal sources. I hadn’t claimed expertise, but I also hadn’t overstated my view. Like you, I was drawing on what I’ve read, observed, and thought through. It’s fair to scrutinize that, but it should cut both ways.

On the China example, I’m not arguing we should copy their system or that it translates directly to us. My point is that they’ve managed to construct a narrative, about resurgence, national dignity, and global standing, that clearly resonates with parts of their population. That kind of civic story, even if it’s state managed, can still have real emotional power. That contrast highlights how little emotional resonance exists in our own national story right now.

It’s worth remembering that much of what China is doing today (coordinated industrial policy, long-term planning, nation-building projects, and civic rituals that cultivate unity) mirrors what the United States did during the New Deal and immediately after World War II. In many ways, they learned from our example. The irony is that they’re still applying lessons we’ve since abandoned.

You mentioned the confidence I show in my opinions. That comes not from pretending to have niche expertise, but from a belief in something more basic: shared human experience.

Human beings everywhere respond to narratives that provide a sense of belonging, purpose, and continuity. That’s not unique to China or the United States; it’s a basic part of political and emotional life. You don’t need to be a specialist to recognize that state-led projects and national myth-making often succeed not just through coercion or control but because they tap into widely felt desires for meaning and pride. It’s the same reason the New Deal era in the U.S. produced such enduring emotional attachment, not just because of the policies, but because of the story those policies told about who we were and where we were going. This is how people experience politics.

What interests me is how we recover that here. Looking to others isn’t about mimicry, it’s about remembering we once led the way.

 

[superrific]

It’s fair to scrutinize that, but it should cut both ways.

I don't think anyone on this board specifies the bases for their opinions as frequently and expressly as I do. In fact, in the original post, I acknowledged the limitations of my sample of opinion. I'm not sure why you think it doesn't cut both ways for me. When I know what I'm talking about, I say so. When I don't know what I'm talking about -- well, I rarely butt in when I know nothing, but sometimes I speculate or generalize from limited experience or am drawing on a couple of articles I read a decade ago and when that's the case, I'm up front about that. I offer it in my original post.

 

[Paine]

I don't think anyone on this board specifies the bases for their opinions as frequently and expressly as I do. In fact, in the original post, I acknowledged the limitations of my sample of opinion. I'm not sure why you think it doesn't cut both ways for me. When I know what I'm talking about, I say so. When I don't know what I'm talking about -- well, I rarely butt in when I know nothing, but sometimes I speculate or generalize from limited experience or am drawing on a couple of articles I read a decade ago and when that's the case, I'm up front about that. I offer it in my original post.

I appreciate that you try to qualify your sources. My point wasn’t to imply you’re never careful. It was to say that scrutiny of views should apply equally, especially when both of us are drawing from limited but thoughtful observation. My concern was with how quickly the question of legitimacy arose when I expressed confidence in a different interpretation, not with whether you’re generally transparent about your assumptions.

What I’m more interested in, ultimately, is how narratives of national purpose resonate with ordinary people, whether in China or here at home. My point has always been that emotional identification with a larger collective story matters politically, even when that story is contested or imperfect. That’s the terrain I think we need to recover in the U.S.

 

[superrific]

I appreciate that you try to qualify your sources. My point wasn’t to imply you’re never careful. It was to say that scrutiny of views should apply equally, especially when both of us are drawing from limited but thoughtful observation. My concern was with how quickly the question of legitimacy arose when I expressed confidence in a different interpretation, not with whether you’re generally transparent about your assumptions.

I asked for the basis of your views -- you know, the same thing I supplied from the outset. If you specify the basis, then your authority will tend to speak for itself, at least vaguely. When I say, "these people told me their opinions," I don't expect you to therefore take it as gospel. It's a "low confidence" claim that should be evaluated accordingly. I don't think it's meaningless; it's clearly not a reliable basis (and that's not even taking account of the passage of time).

If you had said, "here's what I think based on general reading . . . " then I would have no reason to question the legitimacy. It would speak for itself. Low confidence source against low confidence source.

 

[p5mmr9]

So are you suggesting that about 1980, China decided to move fast and break things? If so, interesting that this same sentiment seems to be the animating feature of American's oligarchic tech overlords.

No - they opened their economy to foreign investment. Rather than "move fast and break things" - they built things and improved infrastructure at a pace the world has never seen - beginning with the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.

 

[Centerpiece]

So….
Back to the OP:
Why indeed is China saying all this at this very moment? Mmmm?

 

[Duke Mu]

There are structural issues in China revolving around private debt, unemployment, (lack of) employment opportunities, and both private and commercial real estate. China is overextended in a way that would make americans blush if they were paying attention. This is the nature of their economic slowdown. You could probably argue these issues are cyclical and related to an evolving economy (as you seem to be suggesting) - but I think there are deeper issues that are more cultural and far more difficult to overcome. The chinese economy isn't just evolving - it is in real distress. That pressure has been somewhat alleviated as a direct result of some of Trump's mishandling of the global economy. Trump sought to harm China and in some respects he's propped them up and given them a bit of an out. But these problems aren't just going to vanish with a few ASEAN and EU trade deals.

Trump is accidentally or not coming to China's economic rescue. They were bound for an extended period of stagnation, like Japan had. Trump is attempting to hand over the R&D crown.