Israel launches attack on Iran | US bombs Iran nuke sites

[nycfan]

 

[Mulberry Heel]

I agree with you. We have no idea how this will turn out. That seems to me to be far more reason for pessimism than for optimism, but anyone saying for sure what will happen from here is getting way out over his skiis.

Since we have no idea of how it will turn out, that would seem to be a good point for not having bombed Iran and thus having wait and see how it "will all turn out." As has been pointed out here numerous times, it has been claimed for the past 25 years that Iran is "close" to having a nuke, with very little evidence that has ever been the case. And as has also been pointed out, these bombings didn't destroy Iran's potential to build a nuke - even the Joint Chiefs said that it was way too early to determine that.

 

[Duke Mu]

And that line of thinking is exactly what will draw us into a long drawn out conflict. Netanyahu Has been ringing the alarm bells about Iran and nukes for decades. They’ve been 90% there since 1995.

We just can’t seem to learn our lesson WRT that region.

They’re not going to roll over and play dead.

Our intelligence said Iran was at 60% enrichment. Not even the first stage. 90% is weapons grade. It's not easy to get there.

 

[ZZLPHeels]

You are 100% correct here. I don't think your political program benefits from terms like Orientalist. I'm almost positive that your interlocutor here has no idea what that means, and probably is going to skip over it rather than think about or ask. And you know what? There's no reason he should know what that means. Very few college grads do unless they study in a particular discipline. I know what it means because I'm unusually intellectually curious (especially years ago) and I absorb information like a sponge.

This poster has said he's a fire fighter. Of course that doesn't mean he couldn't understand Said. But it does mean that he's unlikely to have encountered that terminology, and it's OK that he hasn't. Fire fighting is a noble pursuit, but one that takes different training. I'm positive ZZLPHeels cannot teach law. Statistically speaking, it's unlikely he ever could (generally speaking, law professors come from the top 1% of a profession culled from the top 30-40% of college grads, who are themselves the top 30-40% of the population). But by the same token, I can't be a firefighter and I doubt I ever could. Nobody wants my dumb pontificating ass fighting fires. It would be like that Simpsons episode where the nerds calculate air resistance when they are supposed to push the guy out of the way of an oncoming car.

You can talk Orientalism all day with me (though I'd get bored and probably so would you) and probably with a dozen or two dozen other posters. But my guess it that the general population of posters doesn't know what that means. Just my guess. I could be wrong.

What an elitist post, attempting to judge someone's intelligence by their occupation. I used to watch a show called South Park. I'm 100% positive that this show is beneath someone of your stature and education, so I'll summarize an episode that they did about people like you. Basically, the people they depicted got their jollies off by farting into a wine glass and then inhaling their own scent. This sounds like an activity that you might enjoy.

 

[RaiGuy]

well, at what point did he tell others?

He probably decided it after Netanyahu blackmailed him like he did Clinton lol

Netanyahu said to have offered Lewinsky tapes for Pollard | The Times of Israel

www.timesofisrael.com

 

[Mulberry Heel]

Agree on the last part, but Israel did exactly what it needed to do. Iran's nuclear capabilities have been set back substantially with very limited casualties in return. Iran was so weak that, as another poster put it, it would have been almost criminal not to take advantage of this opportunity. They are likely never going to be weaker than they are right now.

Then why in the world did we need to bomb them? You keep saying that they are weaker than ever and even just admitted that their nuclear capabilities have been set back substantially, all of which negates the need for us to bomb them. Even the Joint Chiefs just admitted that we don't know if these bombings have destroyed Iran's capability to build a nuclear bomb, and it almost certainly hasn't. If Iran is so weak and Israel has them under control then there was no need for us to bomb them. You're basically making the argument against your own point, dude.

 

[ZZLPHeels]

This is false.

The United States may destroy the Fordow enrichment plant. It won’t make the Iranian nuclear threat go away

If Israel decides to continue down the military path against Iran’s nuclear program, it has no choice but to ensure that the Fordow enrichment plant no longer poses a threat.

thebulletin.org

This article does not discount my post. In fact, it largely confirms that the attack on Fordow was a necessary act. It also states that Iran was a week away from being able to develop a nuclear weapon.

 

[Duke Mu]

Let's revisit the recent past, in a letter to Obama, before it become Orwellian thoughtcrime:
~~~


August 8, 2015

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

As scientists and engineers with understanding of the physics and technology of
nuclear power and of nuclear weapons, we congratulate you and your team on the
successful completion of the negotiations in Vienna. We consider that the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated
with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can
serve as a guidepost for future non-‐proliferation agreements.

This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any
previously negotiated non-‐proliferation framework. It limits the level of enrichment
of the uranium that Iran can produce, the amount of enriched uranium it can
stockpile, and the number and kinds of centrifuges it can develop and operate. The
agreement bans reconversion and reprocessing of reactor fuel, it requires Iran to
redesign its Arak research reactor to produce far less plutonium than the original
design, and specifies that spent fuel must be shipped out of the country without the
plutonium being separated and before any significant quantity can be accumulated.
A key result of these restrictions is that it would take Iran many months to enrich
uranium for a weapon. We contrast this with the situation before the interim
agreement was negotiated in Lausanne: at that time Iran had accumulated enough
20 percent enriched uranium that the required additional enrichment time for
weapons use was only a few weeks.

The JCPOA also provides for innovative approaches to verification, including
monitoring of uranium mining, milling, and conversion to hexafluoride. Centrifuge
manufacturing and R&D will be monitored as well. For 15 years the Natanz facility
will be the only location where uranium enrichment is allowed to take place and it
will be outfitted with real-‐time monitoring to assure rapid notice of any violation.
The authority is provided for real-‐time monitoring of spent fuel as well.

Concerns about clandestine activities in Iran are greatly mitigated by the dispute
resolution mechanism built into the agreement. The 24-‐day cap on any delay to
access is unprecedented, and will allow effective challenge inspection for the
suspected activities of greatest concern: clandestine enrichment, construction of
reprocessing or reconversion facilities, and implosion tests using uranium. The
approach to resolving “Possible Military Dimensions” is innovative as well: the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be satisfied that it is fully

informed about any previous activities, in order to guide its future verification plans,
but Iran need not be publicly shamed. This agreement, also for the first time,
explicitly bans nuclear weapons R&D, rather than only their manufacture as
specified in the text of the Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Some have expressed concern that the deal will free Iran to develop nuclear
weapons without constraint after ten years. In contrast we find that the deal
includes important long-‐term verification procedures that last until 2040, and
others that last indefinitely under the NPT and its Additional Protocol. On the other
hand, we do believe that it would be valuable to strengthen these durable
international institutions. We recommend that your team work with the IAEA to
gain agreement to implement some of the key innovations included in the JCPOA
into existing safeguards agreements. This will reduce the proliferation risks
associated with national fuel cycle facilities worldwide. Thus in the future, when
Iran is treated the same as all non-‐nuclear weapons states with nuclear energy
programs, all such programs will be more stringently constrained and verified.
As you have stated, this deal does not take any options off the table for you or any
future president. Indeed it will make it much easier for you or a future president to
know if and when Iran heads for a bomb, and the detection of a significant violation
of this agreement will provide strong, internationally supported justification for
intervention.

In conclusion, we congratulate you and your team on negotiating a technically
sound, stringent and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance in
the coming decade and more that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, and
provides a basis for further initiatives to raise the barriers to nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East and around the globe.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus

Robert J. Goldston, Princeton University

R. Scott Kemp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Rush Holt, American Association for the Advancement of Science

Frank von Hippel, Princeton University

John F. Ahearne
Director, Ethics Program at Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society

Philip W. Anderson
Professor Emeritus, Princeton University

Christopher Chyba
Princeton University

Leon N. Cooper
Brown University

Pierce S. Corden
Former Director, Office of International Security Negotiations, Bureau of Arms Control: Department of State

John M. Cornwall
Professor of Physics and Astronomy, UCLA

Sidney D. Drell
Stanford University

Freeman Dyson
Professor Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University

Harold A. Feiveson
Princeton University

Michael E. Fisher
Professor Emeritus, Cornell University and University of Maryland

Howard Georgi
Harvard University

Sheldon L. Glashow
Boston University

Lisbeth Gronlund
Union of Concerned Scientists

David Gross
Professor of Theoretical Physics, Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, UCSB

Sigfried S. Hecker
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

Martin E. Hellman
Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University

Ernest Henley
University of Washington

Gregory Loew
Emeritus Deputy Director and Professor, SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory

C. Kumar N. Patel
Professor Emeritus of Experimental Condensed Matter, UCLA

Burton Richter
Stanford University

Myriam Sarachik
City College of New York, CUNY

Roy F. Schwitters
The University of Texas at Austin

Frank Wilczek
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Wright
Union of Concerned Scientists

This is why Trump hates expertise and education. The truth gets in the way of the Mad Orange King to do whatever the hell he wants.

 

[ZZLPHeels]

Then why in the world did we need to bomb them? You keep saying that they are weaker than ever and even just admitted that their nuclear capabilities have been set back substantially, all of which negates the need for us to bomb them. Even the Joint Chiefs just admitted that we don't know if these bombings have destroyed Iran's capability to build a nuclear bomb, and it almost certainly hasn't. If Iran is so weak and Israel has them under control then there was no need for us to bomb them. You're basically making the argument against your own point, dude.

We needed to bomb them because there was no other way to take out this specific nuclear facility. It isn't a difficult point to understand. Iran's weakness made this a no-brainer....if they were stronger, they would actually be able to retaliate militarily in a significant manner. Right now, they can't.

 

[Duke Mu]

The idea that Iran would nuke the U.S. or Israel is just pure fearmongering. It’s not grounded in strategy or history, it’s manufactured to justify endless violence.

Today's Yellowcake.

 

[an0maly]

Let's revisit the recent past, in a letter to Obama, before it become Orwellian thoughtcrime:
~~~


August 8, 2015

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

As scientists and engineers with understanding of the physics and technology of
nuclear power and of nuclear weapons, we congratulate you and your team on the
successful completion of the negotiations in Vienna. We consider that the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated
with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can
serve as a guidepost for future non-‐proliferation agreements.

This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any
previously negotiated non-‐proliferation framework. It limits the level of enrichment
of the uranium that Iran can produce, the amount of enriched uranium it can
stockpile, and the number and kinds of centrifuges it can develop and operate. The
agreement bans reconversion and reprocessing of reactor fuel, it requires Iran to
redesign its Arak research reactor to produce far less plutonium than the original
design, and specifies that spent fuel must be shipped out of the country without the
plutonium being separated and before any significant quantity can be accumulated.
A key result of these restrictions is that it would take Iran many months to enrich
uranium for a weapon. We contrast this with the situation before the interim
agreement was negotiated in Lausanne: at that time Iran had accumulated enough
20 percent enriched uranium that the required additional enrichment time for
weapons use was only a few weeks.

The JCPOA also provides for innovative approaches to verification, including
monitoring of uranium mining, milling, and conversion to hexafluoride. Centrifuge
manufacturing and R&D will be monitored as well. For 15 years the Natanz facility
will be the only location where uranium enrichment is allowed to take place and it
will be outfitted with real-‐time monitoring to assure rapid notice of any violation.
The authority is provided for real-‐time monitoring of spent fuel as well.

Concerns about clandestine activities in Iran are greatly mitigated by the dispute
resolution mechanism built into the agreement. The 24-‐day cap on any delay to
access is unprecedented, and will allow effective challenge inspection for the
suspected activities of greatest concern: clandestine enrichment, construction of
reprocessing or reconversion facilities, and implosion tests using uranium. The
approach to resolving “Possible Military Dimensions” is innovative as well: the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be satisfied that it is fully

informed about any previous activities, in order to guide its future verification plans,
but Iran need not be publicly shamed. This agreement, also for the first time,
explicitly bans nuclear weapons R&D, rather than only their manufacture as
specified in the text of the Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Some have expressed concern that the deal will free Iran to develop nuclear
weapons without constraint after ten years. In contrast we find that the deal
includes important long-‐term verification procedures that last until 2040, and
others that last indefinitely under the NPT and its Additional Protocol. On the other
hand, we do believe that it would be valuable to strengthen these durable
international institutions. We recommend that your team work with the IAEA to
gain agreement to implement some of the key innovations included in the JCPOA
into existing safeguards agreements. This will reduce the proliferation risks
associated with national fuel cycle facilities worldwide. Thus in the future, when
Iran is treated the same as all non-‐nuclear weapons states with nuclear energy
programs, all such programs will be more stringently constrained and verified.
As you have stated, this deal does not take any options off the table for you or any
future president. Indeed it will make it much easier for you or a future president to
know if and when Iran heads for a bomb, and the detection of a significant violation
of this agreement will provide strong, internationally supported justification for
intervention.

In conclusion, we congratulate you and your team on negotiating a technically
sound, stringent and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance in
the coming decade and more that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, and
provides a basis for further initiatives to raise the barriers to nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East and around the globe.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus

Robert J. Goldston, Princeton University

R. Scott Kemp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Rush Holt, American Association for the Advancement of Science

Frank von Hippel, Princeton University

John F. Ahearne
Director, Ethics Program at Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society

Philip W. Anderson
Professor Emeritus, Princeton University

Christopher Chyba
Princeton University

Leon N. Cooper
Brown University

Pierce S. Corden
Former Director, Office of International Security Negotiations, Bureau of Arms Control: Department of State

John M. Cornwall
Professor of Physics and Astronomy, UCLA

Sidney D. Drell
Stanford University

Freeman Dyson
Professor Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University

Harold A. Feiveson
Princeton University

Michael E. Fisher
Professor Emeritus, Cornell University and University of Maryland

Howard Georgi
Harvard University

Sheldon L. Glashow
Boston University

Lisbeth Gronlund
Union of Concerned Scientists

David Gross
Professor of Theoretical Physics, Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, UCSB

Sigfried S. Hecker
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

Martin E. Hellman
Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University

Ernest Henley
University of Washington

Gregory Loew
Emeritus Deputy Director and Professor, SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory

C. Kumar N. Patel
Professor Emeritus of Experimental Condensed Matter, UCLA

Burton Richter
Stanford University

Myriam Sarachik
City College of New York, CUNY

Roy F. Schwitters
The University of Texas at Austin

Frank Wilczek
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Wright
Union of Concerned Scientists

More thoughtcrime, watch it all.

 

[shonuff]

My son says Iran’s parliament has voted to close the Strait but the final decision doesn’t rest with that body. I don’t have a grasp of Iranian governmental structure so not sure if this is just saber rattling or it’s going to happen.

There is really not an Iranian government structure. Khameni in the ‘Supreme leader’ and the Supreme leader is not elected by the people. He controls the military, judiciary, state media, and has veto power over all other branches of government.

Any public opposition to the Supreme leader results in being jailed or worse.

 

[Duke Mu]

Agree. Yet another wasted opportunity by this idiotic impulse-based administration to build alliances to expand US power. We become more isolated and vulnerable by the day.

And diverted mega resources away from national security.

 

[Mulberry Heel]

How is the thread derailed? We are literally talking about the strike on Iran's nuclear program.

Iran has proven that they are a paper tiger. They are less than that, actually. They are a paper mosquito at this point.

So, yet again, why are we bombing them then? Just for shits and giggles?

 

[ZZLPHeels]

So, yet again, why are we bombing them then? Just for shits and giggles?

We bombed them because that's the only realistic way their nuclear facilities, which are largely buried deep underground, could be destroyed.

 

[1moretimeagain]

Vance believes Iran won’t disrupt the oil trade because it would negatively impact their own economy, but yet he believes Iran would hit the US with a nuclear weapon without regard for how that would impact their country.

 

[an0maly]

This article does not discount my post. In fact, it largely confirms that the attack on Fordow was a necessary act. It also states that Iran was a week away from being able to develop a nuclear weapon.

Your claim of "a million times harder" is false and without meaning or possible reference. They have thousands of centrifuges, and likely moved equipment before the bombings. All of your posts on this making us safer, are variously specious, false, distortions and or disconnected from reality.

 

[superrific]

So, just to be clear, your argument is that more unstable regimes with nuclear weapons is a good thing?

Dude. I defend your positions when they get caricatured, and this is how you repay me? With strawmen and caricatures? I hate being strawmanned.

My argument is that it's neither a good thing nor a bad thing. It's just a thing, and it will have very little effect on our lives. The only thing a nuke gets for Iran is the ability to defend itself against US presidents attacking it for domestic political reasons. Or perhaps to dissuade Israel from bombing it when Israel wants. That's all. My evidence is the entire history of nuclear weapons.

I am all for diplomatic solutions, like the one we had until Trump ripped it up. I am generally speaking against war. There are many reasons for that, but one is the lesson that we've learned -- or should have learned -- from the last fifty years of wayward US military adventures.

Can you name the last Republican president who DIDN'T launch a war or use military force against a Middle Eastern Muslim nation? I think it was Nixon. Depends on how you interpret some of Reagan's actions. Either way, it's a dreadful record. You don't think Iran has a legitimate security interest in defending itself? I think it does, but more importantly it doesn't matter what we think. It matters what Iran thinks. And when you look at it from Iran's point of view, of course they need a nuke. That's what happens when your region gets invaded all the time.

 

[Healing]

So, yet again, why are we bombing them then? Just for shits and giggles?

On this thread, that poster has devolved into the caricature of an ill informed American.

 

[ZZLPHeels]

Your claim of "a million times harder" is false and without meaning or possible reference. They have thousands of centrifuges, and likely moved equipment before the bombings. All of your posts on this making us safer, are variously specious, false, distortions and or disconnected from reality.

Yet the article you posted disagrees:

If the Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program, started on June 13, is to prove successful in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, then a necessary—but not sufficient—step will involve the elimination of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.

The United States may destroy the Fordow enrichment plant. It won’t make the Iranian nuclear threat go away

If Israel decides to continue down the military path against Iran’s nuclear program, it has no choice but to ensure that the Fordow enrichment plant no longer poses a threat.

thebulletin.org

Did you mean to post something else?