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Israel launches attack on Iran | US bombs Iran nuke sites

an0maly said:
Let's revisit the recent past, in a letter to Obama, before it become Orwellian thoughtcrime:
~~~


August 8, 2015

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

As scientists and engineers with understanding of the physics and technology of
nuclear power and of nuclear weapons, we congratulate you and your team on the
successful completion of the negotiations in Vienna. We consider that the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated
with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can
serve as a guidepost for future non-‐proliferation agreements.

This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any
previously negotiated non-‐proliferation framework. It limits the level of enrichment
of the uranium that Iran can produce, the amount of enriched uranium it can
stockpile, and the number and kinds of centrifuges it can develop and operate. The
agreement bans reconversion and reprocessing of reactor fuel, it requires Iran to
redesign its Arak research reactor to produce far less plutonium than the original
design, and specifies that spent fuel must be shipped out of the country without the
plutonium being separated and before any significant quantity can be accumulated.
A key result of these restrictions is that it would take Iran many months to enrich
uranium for a weapon. We contrast this with the situation before the interim
agreement was negotiated in Lausanne: at that time Iran had accumulated enough
20 percent enriched uranium that the required additional enrichment time for
weapons use was only a few weeks.

The JCPOA also provides for innovative approaches to verification, including
monitoring of uranium mining, milling, and conversion to hexafluoride. Centrifuge
manufacturing and R&D will be monitored as well. For 15 years the Natanz facility
will be the only location where uranium enrichment is allowed to take place and it
will be outfitted with real-‐time monitoring to assure rapid notice of any violation.
The authority is provided for real-‐time monitoring of spent fuel as well.

Concerns about clandestine activities in Iran are greatly mitigated by the dispute
resolution mechanism built into the agreement. The 24-‐day cap on any delay to
access is unprecedented, and will allow effective challenge inspection for the
suspected activities of greatest concern: clandestine enrichment, construction of
reprocessing or reconversion facilities, and implosion tests using uranium. The
approach to resolving “Possible Military Dimensions” is innovative as well: the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be satisfied that it is fully

informed about any previous activities, in order to guide its future verification plans,
but Iran need not be publicly shamed. This agreement, also for the first time,
explicitly bans nuclear weapons R&D, rather than only their manufacture as
specified in the text of the Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Some have expressed concern that the deal will free Iran to develop nuclear
weapons without constraint after ten years. In contrast we find that the deal
includes important long-‐term verification procedures that last until 2040, and
others that last indefinitely under the NPT and its Additional Protocol. On the other
hand, we do believe that it would be valuable to strengthen these durable
international institutions. We recommend that your team work with the IAEA to
gain agreement to implement some of the key innovations included in the JCPOA
into existing safeguards agreements. This will reduce the proliferation risks
associated with national fuel cycle facilities worldwide. Thus in the future, when
Iran is treated the same as all non-‐nuclear weapons states with nuclear energy
programs, all such programs will be more stringently constrained and verified.
As you have stated, this deal does not take any options off the table for you or any
future president. Indeed it will make it much easier for you or a future president to
know if and when Iran heads for a bomb, and the detection of a significant violation
of this agreement will provide strong, internationally supported justification for
intervention.

In conclusion, we congratulate you and your team on negotiating a technically
sound, stringent and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance in
the coming decade and more that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, and
provides a basis for further initiatives to raise the barriers to nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East and around the globe.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus

Robert J. Goldston, Princeton University

R. Scott Kemp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Rush Holt, American Association for the Advancement of Science

Frank von Hippel, Princeton University

John F. Ahearne
Director, Ethics Program at Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society

Philip W. Anderson
Professor Emeritus, Princeton University

Christopher Chyba
Princeton University

Leon N. Cooper
Brown University

Pierce S. Corden
Former Director, Office of International Security Negotiations, Bureau of Arms Control: Department of State

John M. Cornwall
Professor of Physics and Astronomy, UCLA

Sidney D. Drell
Stanford University

Freeman Dyson
Professor Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University

Harold A. Feiveson
Princeton University

Michael E. Fisher
Professor Emeritus, Cornell University and University of Maryland

Howard Georgi
Harvard University

Sheldon L. Glashow
Boston University

Lisbeth Gronlund
Union of Concerned Scientists

David Gross
Professor of Theoretical Physics, Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, UCSB

Sigfried S. Hecker
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

Martin E. Hellman
Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University

Ernest Henley
University of Washington

Gregory Loew
Emeritus Deputy Director and Professor, SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory

C. Kumar N. Patel
Professor Emeritus of Experimental Condensed Matter, UCLA

Burton Richter
Stanford University

Myriam Sarachik
City College of New York, CUNY

Roy F. Schwitters
The University of Texas at Austin

Frank Wilczek
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Wright
Union of Concerned Scientists
Click to expand...
This is why Trump hates expertise and education. The truth gets in the way of the Mad Orange King to do whatever the hell he wants.
 
Mulberry Heel said:
Then why in the world did we need to bomb them? You keep saying that they are weaker than ever and even just admitted that their nuclear capabilities have been set back substantially, all of which negates the need for us to bomb them. Even the Joint Chiefs just admitted that we don't know if these bombings have destroyed Iran's capability to build a nuclear bomb, and it almost certainly hasn't. If Iran is so weak and Israel has them under control then there was no need for us to bomb them. You're basically making the argument against your own point, dude.
Click to expand...
We needed to bomb them because there was no other way to take out this specific nuclear facility. It isn't a difficult point to understand. Iran's weakness made this a no-brainer....if they were stronger, they would actually be able to retaliate militarily in a significant manner. Right now, they can't.
 
an0maly said:
Let's revisit the recent past, in a letter to Obama, before it become Orwellian thoughtcrime:
~~~


August 8, 2015

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

As scientists and engineers with understanding of the physics and technology of
nuclear power and of nuclear weapons, we congratulate you and your team on the
successful completion of the negotiations in Vienna. We consider that the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated
with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can
serve as a guidepost for future non-‐proliferation agreements.

This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any
previously negotiated non-‐proliferation framework. It limits the level of enrichment
of the uranium that Iran can produce, the amount of enriched uranium it can
stockpile, and the number and kinds of centrifuges it can develop and operate. The
agreement bans reconversion and reprocessing of reactor fuel, it requires Iran to
redesign its Arak research reactor to produce far less plutonium than the original
design, and specifies that spent fuel must be shipped out of the country without the
plutonium being separated and before any significant quantity can be accumulated.
A key result of these restrictions is that it would take Iran many months to enrich
uranium for a weapon. We contrast this with the situation before the interim
agreement was negotiated in Lausanne: at that time Iran had accumulated enough
20 percent enriched uranium that the required additional enrichment time for
weapons use was only a few weeks.

The JCPOA also provides for innovative approaches to verification, including
monitoring of uranium mining, milling, and conversion to hexafluoride. Centrifuge
manufacturing and R&D will be monitored as well. For 15 years the Natanz facility
will be the only location where uranium enrichment is allowed to take place and it
will be outfitted with real-‐time monitoring to assure rapid notice of any violation.
The authority is provided for real-‐time monitoring of spent fuel as well.

Concerns about clandestine activities in Iran are greatly mitigated by the dispute
resolution mechanism built into the agreement. The 24-‐day cap on any delay to
access is unprecedented, and will allow effective challenge inspection for the
suspected activities of greatest concern: clandestine enrichment, construction of
reprocessing or reconversion facilities, and implosion tests using uranium. The
approach to resolving “Possible Military Dimensions” is innovative as well: the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be satisfied that it is fully

informed about any previous activities, in order to guide its future verification plans,
but Iran need not be publicly shamed. This agreement, also for the first time,
explicitly bans nuclear weapons R&D, rather than only their manufacture as
specified in the text of the Non-‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Some have expressed concern that the deal will free Iran to develop nuclear
weapons without constraint after ten years. In contrast we find that the deal
includes important long-‐term verification procedures that last until 2040, and
others that last indefinitely under the NPT and its Additional Protocol. On the other
hand, we do believe that it would be valuable to strengthen these durable
international institutions. We recommend that your team work with the IAEA to
gain agreement to implement some of the key innovations included in the JCPOA
into existing safeguards agreements. This will reduce the proliferation risks
associated with national fuel cycle facilities worldwide. Thus in the future, when
Iran is treated the same as all non-‐nuclear weapons states with nuclear energy
programs, all such programs will be more stringently constrained and verified.
As you have stated, this deal does not take any options off the table for you or any
future president. Indeed it will make it much easier for you or a future president to
know if and when Iran heads for a bomb, and the detection of a significant violation
of this agreement will provide strong, internationally supported justification for
intervention.

In conclusion, we congratulate you and your team on negotiating a technically
sound, stringent and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance in
the coming decade and more that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, and
provides a basis for further initiatives to raise the barriers to nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East and around the globe.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus

Robert J. Goldston, Princeton University

R. Scott Kemp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Rush Holt, American Association for the Advancement of Science

Frank von Hippel, Princeton University

John F. Ahearne
Director, Ethics Program at Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society

Philip W. Anderson
Professor Emeritus, Princeton University

Christopher Chyba
Princeton University

Leon N. Cooper
Brown University

Pierce S. Corden
Former Director, Office of International Security Negotiations, Bureau of Arms Control: Department of State

John M. Cornwall
Professor of Physics and Astronomy, UCLA

Sidney D. Drell
Stanford University

Freeman Dyson
Professor Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University

Harold A. Feiveson
Princeton University

Michael E. Fisher
Professor Emeritus, Cornell University and University of Maryland

Howard Georgi
Harvard University

Sheldon L. Glashow
Boston University

Lisbeth Gronlund
Union of Concerned Scientists

David Gross
Professor of Theoretical Physics, Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, UCSB

Sigfried S. Hecker
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

Martin E. Hellman
Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University

Ernest Henley
University of Washington

Gregory Loew
Emeritus Deputy Director and Professor, SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory

C. Kumar N. Patel
Professor Emeritus of Experimental Condensed Matter, UCLA

Burton Richter
Stanford University

Myriam Sarachik
City College of New York, CUNY

Roy F. Schwitters
The University of Texas at Austin

Frank Wilczek
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Wright
Union of Concerned Scientists
Click to expand...
More thoughtcrime, watch it all.

 
HandsonFire said:
My son says Iran’s parliament has voted to close the Strait but the final decision doesn’t rest with that body. I don’t have a grasp of Iranian governmental structure so not sure if this is just saber rattling or it’s going to happen.
Click to expand...
There is really not an Iranian government structure. Khameni in the ‘Supreme leader’ and the Supreme leader is not elected by the people. He controls the military, judiciary, state media, and has veto power over all other branches of government.

Any public opposition to the Supreme leader results in being jailed or worse.
 
ZZLPHeels said:
This article does not discount my post. In fact, it largely confirms that the attack on Fordow was a necessary act. It also states that Iran was a week away from being able to develop a nuclear weapon.
Click to expand...
Your claim of "a million times harder" is false and without meaning or possible reference. They have thousands of centrifuges, and likely moved equipment before the bombings. All of your posts on this making us safer, are variously specious, false, distortions and or disconnected from reality.
 
ZZLPHeels said:
So, just to be clear, your argument is that more unstable regimes with nuclear weapons is a good thing?
Click to expand...
Dude. I defend your positions when they get caricatured, and this is how you repay me? With strawmen and caricatures? I hate being strawmanned.

My argument is that it's neither a good thing nor a bad thing. It's just a thing, and it will have very little effect on our lives. The only thing a nuke gets for Iran is the ability to defend itself against US presidents attacking it for domestic political reasons. Or perhaps to dissuade Israel from bombing it when Israel wants. That's all. My evidence is the entire history of nuclear weapons.

I am all for diplomatic solutions, like the one we had until Trump ripped it up. I am generally speaking against war. There are many reasons for that, but one is the lesson that we've learned -- or should have learned -- from the last fifty years of wayward US military adventures.

Can you name the last Republican president who DIDN'T launch a war or use military force against a Middle Eastern Muslim nation? I think it was Nixon. Depends on how you interpret some of Reagan's actions. Either way, it's a dreadful record. You don't think Iran has a legitimate security interest in defending itself? I think it does, but more importantly it doesn't matter what we think. It matters what Iran thinks. And when you look at it from Iran's point of view, of course they need a nuke. That's what happens when your region gets invaded all the time.
 
an0maly said:
Your claim of "a million times harder" is false and without meaning or possible reference. They have thousands of centrifuges, and likely moved equipment before the bombings. All of your posts on this making us safer, are variously specious, false, distortions and or disconnected from reality.
Click to expand...
Yet the article you posted disagrees:

If the Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program, started on June 13, is to prove successful in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, then a necessary—but not sufficient—step will involve the elimination of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.
thebulletin.org

The United States may destroy the Fordow enrichment plant. It won’t make the Iranian nuclear threat go away

If Israel decides to continue down the military path against Iran’s nuclear program, it has no choice but to ensure that the Fordow enrichment plant no longer poses a threat.
thebulletin.org thebulletin.org

Did you mean to post something else?
 
Duke Mu said:
And diverted mega resources away from national security.
Click to expand...
The great irony of America First is that, when it comes to global influence and national security, we’ve been an unchallenged #1 for almost 40 years now. And an average president likely could have kept us there for another 50. But the odds are now shockingly high that we won’t be #1 in November 2028. We may not even be the top three.
 
ZZLPHeels said:
We bombed them because that's the only realistic way their nuclear facilities, which are largely buried deep underground, could be destroyed.
Click to expand...
But as people keep pointing out, there is little to no evidence that they were close to actually having a nuclear bomb, and no evidence that this bombing has actually hurt their chances of building one. If anything, it is likely only going to cause them to redouble their efforts to build one. And your persistent arguments about how weak Iran is only keep undermining your argument that we needed to bomb them. If Israel already had them on their knees and they're weaker than ever then there was no need for us to get involved, beyond Dear Leader's desire to bomb somebody to prove how tough he is.
 
Mulberry Heel said:
But as people keep pointing out, there is little to no evidence that they were close to actually having a nuclear bomb, and no evidence that this bombing has actually hurt their chances of building one. If anything, it is likely only going to cause them to redouble their efforts to build one. And your persistent arguments about how weak Iran is only keep undermining your argument that we needed to bomb them. If Israel already had them on their knees and they're weaker than ever then there was no need for us to get involved, beyond Dear Leader's desire to bomb somebody to prove how tough he is.
Click to expand...
As an0maly graciously pointed out, Iran was "less than a week" from being able to develop a nuclear weapon. You can't build a nuclear weapon in your grandma's garage. It is a tremendously complicated labor and resource-intensive effort, which is why there are only a handful of countries that have them. Taking out a nuclear enrichment facility that took many many years to build is a significant setback for Iran's nuclear program and it will take them some time to recover from it. There is a good chance that they will never be able to recover from these setbacks. That's why they built this facility literally inside of a mountain....they didn't want anything to happen to it.
 
ZZLPHeels said:
Yet the article you posted disagrees:

If the Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program, started on June 13, is to prove successful in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, then a necessary—but not sufficient—step will involve the elimination of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.
thebulletin.org

The United States may destroy the Fordow enrichment plant. It won’t make the Iranian nuclear threat go away

If Israel decides to continue down the military path against Iran’s nuclear program, it has no choice but to ensure that the Fordow enrichment plant no longer poses a threat.
thebulletin.org thebulletin.org

Did you mean to post something else?
Click to expand...
I now confirm you are a essentially a troll, and will not respond to you again. The use of "million" by you was idiotic. Right in your quote it says "not sufficient."

From the article, and intentionally ignored by you:

But the United States and Israel must acknowledge that Fordow is not the only pathway for an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Iran may have other centrifuges available, including at secret sites, and probably already at work. On June 12, Iran said that it would retaliate for the IAEA Board of Governors’ adoption of a resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its treaty obligations by unveiling another secret “invulnerable” enrichment facility. Iran could also have a stock of additional centrifuges that it could either rapidly install or use, with enriched uranium from other parts of the country serving as feedstock. Destroying or rendering Fordow inoperable would not preclude Iran from using these alternative sites to potentially produce one or several nuclear weapons.
 
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