I had to read your reply a couple of times. Several things come to mind.
I believe a degree of corruption exists in all societies; the first world just has glossier mechanisms for the trafficking of influences. In Latin America, for the most part, sadly, the corruption is crude and open. There is a pretty consistent pattern of most countries (with all sorts of governments) of persons abusing their positions of power for economical gain. In some countries (Uruguay and Chile come to mind) there is a social aversion to corruption, while in others it's a daily way of life (Mexico is always the poster boy). Venezuela has always been corrupt society.
There's a saying in Spanish that the bad thing about a circle of influence (argolla) is not to be in it. When Chavez came to power one arolla was traded for another. The Chavez people in charge of these programs saw the opportunity to benefit personally and took it.
Can external factors (sanctions, capital flight) exacerbate corruption? Of course...those pressures create choke points of power that create opportunity. But I think it starts with a base corruption.
I don’t disagree that corruption exists everywhere, or that Latin American states entered the 21st century with weaker institutions than the U.S. or Europe. That still doesn’t answer the question I’m trying to surface.
Appealing to the idea of a “base” level of corruption fails to explain why corruption scales and becomes system-defining under sanctions and siege conditions, rather than remaining diffuse. That requires a causal account of how institutions change when formal markets collapse, discretionary power concentrates, and informal networks replace legal ones.
You gesture at this when you note that sanctions and capital flight create choke points. My point is that those choke points are the mechanism by which corruption becomes entrenched. Once access to currency, imports, or trade licenses is politically rationed, corruption stops being incidental and becomes structural.
Since you raised Chile and Uruguay, I think they actually reinforce the institutional argument. The social aversion to corruption in those cases emerged alongside longer periods of bureaucratic professionalization, more predictable access to trade and capital, and the absence of durable bottlenecks where discretion could be converted into rents.
Where rule-bound institutions are stable and markets function, corruption stays costly and risky, so social norms form against it. Under siege conditions, the reverse happens: discretion expands, informal networks become necessary for survival, and corruption becomes normalized regardless of prior norms.
If corruption were primarily cultural, we wouldn’t see such consistent patterns across very different societies subjected to external pressure. Of course Venezuela wasn’t pure before sanctions, but the question remains: why does siege reliably produce institutional degeneration rather than institutional reform?
I might just be misunderstanding your argument. When you say “base corruption,” can you clarify what you mean analytically? Are you describing a cultural disposition that precedes institutions, or an institutional history that shapes incentives over time? I’m asking because if corruption is treated as a starting condition rather than an outcome, it’s not clear how that explains the shift in scale and structure once sanctions and other choke points emerge.